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UPSIDE DOWN? TERRORISTS,
PROPRIETORS, AND CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR CRIME PREVENTION IN THE POST-9/11
TORT-REFORM WORLD
Ellen M. Bublick*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 9/11 tragedy, one might have been excused
for thinking that everything had been turned on its head-vehicles of
public transportation became weapons of large-scale destruction,
centers of great wealth turned into sites of unending loss. After the
turmoil, any number of matters seemed in disarray-even, it turns
out, the tort law.
Perhaps the case that most vividly illustrated the seeming
incoherence of the post-9/11 tort law was a suit that began with the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, but was not decided until after
the 2001 blast. In October 2005, a New York jury was asked to
determine the availability of tort recovery to citizens and businesses
injured in the first World Trade Center explosion. The jury assigned
fault for that destruction to the terrorists who deliberately planted and
ignited a bomb in the building's underground parking garage.' The
jury also assigned fault to the World Trade Center's owner and
operator, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, for its
failure to adopt the more rigorous security measures previously
recommended to it by its own security experts.2 Those disregarded
. Dan B. Dobbs Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of
Law. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, many thanks to Barbara Atwood, Curtis
Bridgeman, Dan Dobbs, Jon Hanson, Gregory Keating, Andy Klein, Marc Miller, Robert Rabin,
Carol Rose, David Shapiro, Kirsten Smolensky, Brent White, members of the Florida State
University College of Law colloquium series, and participants in Loyola Law School's Frontiers
of Tort Law symposium. Particular thanks to my extraordinary and tireless research assistants,
Timothy Reppucci, Mark Sorokin and Victoria Torrilhon.
1. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., No. 600000/94 (N.Y. Mar. 2, 2007).
2. Id.
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measures included closing the building to public parking and
screening entering trucks for explosives as a lesser precaution against
truck bombs.
Traditionally, at this juncture in the case, the court would have
thanked the jury for its service and sent the case forward for
determination of appropriate compensatory damages. However,
following a recent New York Court of Appeals decision,4 the jury
was given one new task-to apportion percentages of civil
responsibility between the parties. The jury proceeded to apportion
responsibility for the devastation as follows: terrorists 32 percent,
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 68 percent.5 In the tort
action, the Port Authority was twice as responsible for the
devastation as were the terrorists themselves.
Public bewilderment, even outrage, over the jury's verdict was
palpable. 6  "Shredding Common Sense," one newspaper wailed.7
"[O]bviously irrational," cried a second.' "[A]n argument for people
who want to abolish the jury system," suggested a third.9 Even the
kindest media coverage of the story cast the verdict as a jury
mistake." To the common eye, the jurors' conclusion was
3. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 2004), affd, In re
World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig. Steering Comm. v. The Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 784 N.Y.S.
2d 869 (App. Div. 2004) (denying in substantial part defendants' motion for summary judgment
and outlining plaintiffs' valid claims).
4. See Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that the trial court erred in
setting aside the jury's apportionment of liability between the defendant building owner and the
non-party assailant).
5. Anemona Hartocollis, Port Authority Found Negligent in 1993 Bombing, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2005, at A6.
6. Vincent Carroll, Editorial, On Point: Vexing Development, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2005, at 30A (calling the verdict "patently absurd and morally vicious"); Editorial,
Casting Blame, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 27, 2005, at 6 (suggesting that "this ruling could make everyone
less safe"); Lawsuits May Be Factor in Future Policy, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 1, 2005, at B5
(calling verdicts "outlandish" and "a bizarre travesty"); Editorial, Misplaced Blame in Bombing,
STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 3, 2005, at 18 (calling the assignment of primary blame to the Port
Authority "ludicrous").
7. Ralph R. Reiland, Shredding Common Sense, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Dec. 5, 2005.
8. 1993 Hindsight, N.Y. POST, Oct. 30, 2005 at 28 (arguing that the terrorists "and they
alone, deserve the blame for what happened").
9. CNN American Morning (CNN television broadcast Oct. 27, 2005) (quoting Jeffrey
Toobin, CNN Legal Analyst) (suggesting, however, that the verdict might be explainable).
10. See Clyde Haberman, Sometimes Big Brother Is a Protector, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005,
at BI (calling the jurors' calculation "mathematical wizardry" and sarcastically claiming pity for
the terrorists); Anemona Hartocollis, Port Authority Fears Costs from Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2005, at B I (calling the verdict "a startling footnote to history" and suggesting that jurors,
motivated by sympathy for victims, were trying to ensure that someone would pay).
UPSIDE DO WN?
inexplicable. Here was another out-of-control jury stuck in the
limelight with an embarrassing public gaffe.11
But what if the jurors' verdict was correct, at least within the
parameters of New York law? The people empanelled to hear the
facts of the case and instructed about the state's legal rules
themselves reached the verdict. 2 Perhaps less noted if more
significant, the trial and intermediate appellate courts have upheld
the ruling.13  Further appeals may follow. Could the law warrant
such a seemingly confused result? Could the public support such a
seemingly confused judgment of law?
The answer to these questions is important not only to the 1993
World Trade Center Bombing Litigation itself 4 but to contemporary
tort recoveries more generally. The 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing Litigation verdict, though unique in attracting public
attention, is not unique in the conclusion reached by its jurors. In
jurisdictions that apply comparative apportionment laws similar to
those applied in New York, juries have embraced similar institution-
heavy apportionments-holding proprietors and other institutional
entities more civilly responsible for harm than the criminal
assailants. 5 For instance, in an Arizona case, a jury held that a 9-1-1
operator who misclassified a domestic-violence victim's call as low
priority was more responsible for the caller's murder than was the
ex-boyfriend who committed the crime.16 Similarly, in Michigan,
when apportioning responsibility for a drunken assault, jurors
assigned greater responsibility to the bar that negligently served
alcohol to a patron past the point of his obvious intoxication than to
11. Editorial, A Terror-ble Ruling, N.Y. POST, Jan. 13, 2008, at 26 (arguing that the court of
appeals should "toss out a preposterous 2005 jury finding") [hereinafter A Terror-ble Ruling].
12. Hartocollis, supra note 5, at A6 (noting that the jurors ruled six to zero on the issue of
the Port Authority's negligence).
13. Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 598 (App. Div. 2008); In re
World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., No. 600000/94 (N.Y. Mar. 2, 2007).
14. The full title of the civil litigation is "In re World Trade Center Bombing Litigation." For
clarity, throughout the Article I refer to the litigation as the "1993 World Trade Center Bombing
Litigation."
15. I use the term "criminal" for ease of reading, although this standard would apply to any
intentional tortfeasor, criminal or not. In addition, I use the term "institution-heavy
apportionments" to describe apportionments that assign a greater share of responsibility to the
negligent defendant than to the intentional-tortfeasor defendant. Although these negligent
defendants need not be institutional actors, in the vast majority of the appellate court cases they
are.
16. Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 451 (Ariz. 1998).
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the drunken patron who committed the crime." In a case of child
sexual abuse committed by a church-school teacher, a Kentucky jury
found that the diocese that ignored the teacher's past improprieties
and potentially uncured pedophilia had more responsibility for his
continued perpetuation of child abuse than did the teacher himself.'8
Additional juries have reached similar verdicts. 9 There is reason to
suspect that more of the same is on the way. Confused? Upside-
down?
Well, yes. But the problem is not (unfortunately) the particular
jurors in these cases or the verdicts that they have reached. Instead,
in this Article I argue that what is upside down-both in the 1993
World Trade Center Bombing Litigation and in other cases like it-is
recent tort-reform-produced state apportionment law that asks juries
to divide civil responsibility between parties that fail to use
appropriate precautions to prevent crime and those who perpetrate it.
It is a mistake of logic to suggest that the fault of a negligent
defendant like the Port Authority necessarily diminishes as the fault
of intentional tortfeasors such as the terrorists increases."z Both
defendants can behave in a wrongful way at the same time.
Moreover, the fact that the terrorist truck bombing occurred is
inculpatory of the Port Authority's failure to take reasonable
precautions to prevent a terrorist attack, not exculpatory.2' When
parties are liable for failing to take adequate precautions against
crime, jurors should not be asked to divide responsibility between
parties that enable and those who perpetrate the intentional harms-
the situation of the parties involved in the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing Litigation. Ideally, the verdicts in the 1993 World Trade
Center Bombing case and other cases like it will be harbingers of
change-leading the minority of jurisdictions that permit
17. Weiss v. Hodge, 567 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Mich. 1997).
18. Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ky. 1998).
19. See, e.g., Ortiz v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Manuel G.
v. Golden State Family Servs., 2006 WL 965792 (Cal. 2006); Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini,
799 N.E.2d 1048 (Ind. 2003).
20. Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 595 (App. Div. 2008).
21. Id.; see also WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 44
(5th ed. 1984) ("Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the
risk, or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which [the defendant] has subjected the
plaintiff has indeed come to pass.").
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apportionment between intentional and negligent torts, including
New York, to rethink that approach.
The focus on judicial change stems from the fact that courts
created, and therefore can revise, many of the legal doctrines that
now permit such apportionment. However, state legislatures are also
free to act in this sphere. In neighboring Connecticut, when the
public learned of the state supreme court's plan to include intentional
torts in the jurisdiction's comparative apportionment system, the
people promptly pushed the legislature to revive the old system-in
which intentional torts played no part in comparative calculations.22
At a minimum, courts that elect to apportion responsibility
between intentional and negligent torts should harmonize their legal
rules with apportionment doctrines crafted by national authorities
like the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability. In
particular, courts should not apportion responsibility in cases in
which the negligent party's "very duty" was to take precautions to
prevent the intentional harm. This "very duty" rule, recommended
by the Restatement for each of the five types of state apportionment
systems it catalogued, would disallow apportionment when the
negligent defendant's very duty was to take reasonable care "to
[p]rotect the [p]laintiff from the [s]pecific [r]isk of an [i]ntentional
[t]ort."23  The rule would prevent a proprietor such as the Port
Authority from being careless with respect to protection from
terrorist attacks and then raising the paradoxical claim that
responsibility for its own misconduct should be diminished because
the conduct resulted in the very harm that it failed to take steps to
prevent.24 Instead, the proprietor could be called on to pay full
compensatory damages for victim harm that arises from its
negligence. The "very duty" doctrine has origins in New York law
22. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(o) (2008) (generally excluding apportionment
"between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence
including, but not limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct, strict liability or liability
pursuant to any cause of action created by statute"); Bhinder v. Sun Co., 717 A.2d 202, 242-43
(Conn. 1998) (holding that comparative fault act amended in 1986 to make each person liable
only for his proportionate share of damages did not include intentional torts in apportionment
calculations, but that intentional torts should be included in the system as a matter of common
law).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14 (2000).
24. PROSSERETAL., supra 21, § 44.
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dating back to at least the 1940s and should be maintained.25
Additional solutions crafted by national authorities such as the
National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws can be considered
at the legislative level.26
However, for courts that apportion defendants' intentional and
negligent responsibility and do not follow the ameliorative rules of
national authorities like the Restatement (or in a small number of
jurisdictions, for courts that cannot follow those rules due to specific
statutory restrictions), the question becomes one of second-best
solutions. 7 In the realm of the second-best, I argue that appellate
courts should uphold institution-heavy apportionments-
apportionments that allot more than 50 percent of the total
responsibility to negligent rather than intentional actors. These jury
determinations are not only consistent with state, and indeed multi-
state tort law, but they also preserve a vehicle for recognizing the
accountability of institutional actors. By preserving these judgments,
tort law can concentrate on its own goals of accountability,
deterrence, and compensation 8 rather than provide redundant
primary focus on the accountability of criminal actors.
While the immediate result-upholding seemingly inverse
apportionments in cases like the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
Litigation-may initially appear incomprehensible to the broader
public, I argue that the outcome can be made intelligible under
traditional accountability principles. For this to happen, courts must
clarify that tort apportionment focuses on apportionment of civil
responsibility rather than apportionment of fault. Moreover, to
uphold such a finding, the system of civil responsibility must be
viewed as only one part of a more comprehensive system of legal
25. Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 459 (N.Y. 1980); Abbott v. N.Y. Pub.
Library, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966-67 (App. Div. 1942).
26. See UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT (2002) (creating an
apportionment system that reassigns uncollectible shares).
27. R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. 11 (1956). Of course, negligent third-party liability for failure to prevent criminal harms is
itself already a second-best solution.
28. See Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A
Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171 (2008) (outlining strategies that
incorporate both consequentialist and deontological goals for tort law).
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responsibility, which includes the criminal courts.2 ' Apportionment
of tort liability is not the same as apportionment of all legal penalties
or of all moral blame. When civil and criminal penalties assigned in
the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing cases are viewed as a whole,
it is clear that even with a 68 percent civil-responsibility assignment,
the Port Authority still was tagged with a far smaller share of the
overall responsibility and culpability for the bombing than were the
terrorists themselves. To be specific, the terrorists are currently
serving more-than-life sentences in maximum security prison and
have multimillion-dollar fines and orders of restitution assessed
against them."° In addition, the terrorists, as intentional tortfeasors,
can be tagged with full compensatory damage judgments in New
York's civil system, notwithstanding the 32 percent apportionment
of responsibility.3' In contrast, there are no reports that any Port
Authority official was jailed or fined, and after fifteen years the Port
Authority has yet to pay the civil damages awarded for its lack of
care.
3 2
In sum, this Article argues that courts should avoid all or at least
certain intentional/negligent responsibility comparisons, particularly
in situations where the negligent actor's very duty was to take steps
to prevent the intentional harm. However, courts' second-best
position is to uphold all jury apportionments, even those that assign
greater, perhaps even far greater, responsibility to negligent than
intentional parties.
To explain this thesis, Part I of this Article provides an overview
of the case that brought public attention to the issue of institution-
heavy apportionments of responsibility-the 1993 World Trade
Center Bombing Litigation. The section examines the circumstances
of the World Trade Center bombing. It also examines the litigation
29. Jules Coleman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1149 (2008)
(discussing Calabresi's argument that tort law "occupies the essential normative and practical
space between the criminal law on the one hand and contract law on the other").
30. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Driver Gets 240 Years in Prison for Bombing of Trade
Center, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1998, at B2.
3 1. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602(5), (7) (McKinney 2008). Of course, the plaintiff can receive only
one satisfaction of the injury claim. See 487 Elmwood, Inc. v. Hassett, 486 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App.
Div. 1985).
32. See David W. Dunlap, A Disaster That Tragedy Relegated to Second Place, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2008, at B3 (noting that on the fifteenth anniversary of the bombing "some victims of the
attack are still fighting in court with the Port Authority").
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that emanated from the bombing-not only the civil litigation, but
the criminal litigation as well.
Part II briefly reviews two types of laws that are instrumental in
determining proprietor payouts in negligent security suits-
proprietor liability and comparative apportionment law. The section
outlines how these laws have changed, in New York as elsewhere,
over the past fifty years. It also describes how changes in these laws
have led to the recent phenomenon of juror percentage-based
divisions of responsibility in negligent security actions.
Part III looks at a question that the courts and legislature have
not yet examined-the effects of including intentional torts in
several-liability comparative apportionment systems. Most, if not
all, of the effects of including intentional torts in apportionment are
not desired even by courts that embrace that doctrine. A number of
red-herring arguments of logic, not contemplated policy preferences,
have led courts to select these poor policy outcomes. The section
suggests that when the effects of including intentional torts in
apportionment are examined, it is easier to see that intentional torts
should not be included in apportionment or should be limited by
ameliorative doctrines of the Restatement (Third) of Apportionment
such as the "very duty" rule.
However, if states choose to make unlimited intentional-
negligent fault comparisons between multiple defendants, Part IV
examines how courts can most coherently review jury answers to the
impossible question posed to them. After reviewing suggested
national standards and examining prior opinions of state courts that
have reviewed institution-heavy apportionments, the section
ultimately concludes that courts should view apportionment as a
method of dividing civil responsibility between defendants. In that
vein, even judgments assigning a greater civil-responsibility share to
the negligent party can be justified, both within a set of formal legal
rules and in accordance with policy considerations, in the courthouse
and to a broader public audience (which the jurors themselves
represent).
The issue of apportionment in the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing Litigation is important in its own right. The ultimate
disposition of the case by the New York courts will have a
significant effect on victim compensation in litigation filed by the
1490
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victims of the 1993 bombing. However, the importance of the case
extends far beyond the litigants themselves.
Tort litigation stemming from the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing highlights the current tension between, on one hand, the
public's desire for liability limitation in the post-tort-reform world
and, on the other, the public's hope for institutional actors to take
reasonable security precautions against foreseeable criminal and
even terrorist harm, particularly post-9/1 1 when those harms seem all
the more lethal.33 When asked to apportion responsibility between
the Port Authority and the terrorists-in real effect, between tort
liability for the Port Authority and no tort liability for the Port
Authority-jurors making civil-responsibility judgments are faced
with the difficult task of mediating these dual interests in liability
limitation and accountability for care. Judicial support for juries'
front-line verdicts will affect whether jurors continue to have the
prerogative to call on tort law to play its established role in
encouraging care to protect against criminal harms.
I. IN RE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING LITIGATION
Well before the September blast that changed the nation's
course, another terrorist attack assaulted the prominent New York
City landmarks. Shortly after noon on February 26, 1993, terrorists
drove a rented Ryder van packed with explosives into the World
Trade Center's underground public parking lot.34 They set off the
explosives with a time-delayed fuse and immediately fled the
building.35 The bomb exploded with the force of 1500 pounds of
dynamite.36 The blast created a crater five stories deep in the
33. See George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 175, 177 (2007) (concluding that "tort law will continue to be eroded by attrition"); Neal R.
Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 994
(2003) (discussing a psychometric approach which shows that "the more a risk is dreaded, the
greater the support for strict regulation to reduce or eliminate the risk").
34. Anemona Hartocollis, Blame for 1993 Attack at Center Is Still at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2008, at B3.
35. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 18 (1998) (testimony of Henry J. DePippo).
36. The World Trade Center Bombing: A Tragic Wake-Up Call: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Investigations, Taxation, and Government Operations, N.Y. State S., at 9 (N.Y. Aug. 3, 1993)
(testimony of Port Authority Director Stanley Brezenoff).
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underground portion of the World Trade Center. 7 The bombing
killed six people, including a pregnant woman who was having lunch
in a cafeteria nearby and a person who was buried in rubble at the
bottom of the crater and not found until days later.38 Four of the
victims were killed when a steel beam weighing approximately 3000
pounds was propelled thirty feet inside tower one.39
Damage to the World Trade Center buildings was not localized
to the bombed area itself. The explosion sent smoke through
ventilation and elevator shafts.4" Two million gallons of water
rushed from severed pipes.4' Electricity, lighting, heat, emergency
power, and running water were all shut down.42 There was no way to
communicate with the tens of thousands of tenants and visitors who
were forced to evacuate the building. 3  Many panicked.' A
thousand people were injured.45 Injuries included smoke inhalation,
damage to organs, and crushed limbs.46 As the U.S. Attorney
responsible for prosecutions stemming from the 1993 bombing
testified before Congress in 1998, "[a]part from certain battles in the
Civil War," prior to that date, the 1993 bombing "was the largest
patient-producing incident in United States history."47
Businesses inside the building also suffered millions of dollars
of damage.48 Estimates suggested that "dislocation and the loss of
business" accounted for the bulk of an estimated $330 million in
37. Richard Bernstein, Explosion at the Twin Towers; 4 Are Convicted in Bombing at the
World Trade Center that Killed 6, Stunned US., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1994, § 1, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 18 (testimony of Henry J. DePippo).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. at 17, 19 (noting that on any given day 100,000 people traveled through the World
Trade Center and that there was no way to communicate with tenants and visitors).
44. Bernstein, supra note 37. For testimony concerning evacuation without communications
in the dark through 100 floors of smoke-filled stairwells, see The World Trade Center Bombing:
A Tragic Wake-Up Call, supra note 36, at 24-29.
45. The World Trade Center Bombing: A Tragic Wake-Up Call, supra note 36.
46. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 18 (testimony of Henry J. DePippo).
47. Id.
48. Andrew Blum, Trade Center Verdict Spurs Suits, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1994, at A5
(putting the figure at $550 million).
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costs to businesses in the very first week.49 Other sources estimated
the first week's economic damage to companies and government
agencies at $692 million." Although commodities exchanges in the
building reopened that week, firms were unable to move back for a
longer period of time.5'
After the tragedy, police located four of the assailants-Messrs.
Salameh, Ayyad, Abouhalima, and Ajaj. 2 The four were arrested
and tried in New York federal court. 3 The prosecution presented
"mountains of evidence" against the defendants, who said little or
nothing in their own defense. 4 The evidence revealed many details
of the conspirators' plans, as well as their roles in the bombing.
Their participation included securing chemicals and detonators to
create the explosive device, renting the van, planting the bomb inside
it, sending messages to news media seeking credit for the
destruction, and (famously) trying to secure from the car rental
company a refund of the deposit placed on the exploded van.5
The four conspirators were convicted on a wide range of
charges-in fact, on every charge that the government had pursued
against them.56  Those charges included conspiracy, explosive
destruction of private property, explosive destruction of government
property, interstate transportation of explosives, destruction of motor
vehicles, assault upon a federal officer, and using or carrying a
destructive device during a violent crime. 7 Two of the four men
were also convicted of international travel as part of a commission of
a crime. 8 Each of the four was sentenced to 240 years in prison. 9
49. After the Blast, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 1993, at 78.
50. Peter Marks, The Twin Towers: Opening of Twin Towers Unlikely to Occur Until Next
Month, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at Al.
51. After the Blast, supra note 49, at 78.
52. Bernstein, supra note 37, §1, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1, at 29; see also Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade
Center, supra note 35, at 12 (testimony of J. Gilmore Childers) (noting that at trial there were
over 1000 exhibits and 200 witnesses).
55. Bernstein, supra note 37, § 1, at 29; Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the
World Trade Center, supra note 35, at 15-16.
56. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 12 (testimony of Henry J. DePippo).
57. Bernstein, supra note 37, §1, at 29; see United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
58. Bernstein, supra note 37, §1, at 29.
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On review, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the four
should not have been allowed to represent themselves at sentencing.6"
Represented by attorneys on remand, the four were resentenced to
terms of more than 100 years.6 Those greater-than-life-expectancy
prison terms were upheld by the appellate court.62 Fifteen years after
the bombing, all four remain in maximum security penitentiaries
with posted release dates far in the future.63 At sentencing, each of
the four was fined $250,000 and ordered to pay restitution of $250
million.64 On appeal, the Second Circuit found that these amounts
could not be made immediately payable given the prisoners' lack of
assets. However, the amounts would become payable should any of
the men receive future payments for the sale of his account of the
bomb plot.
65
A second criminal case was filed against a broader group of
defendants who were part of a conspiracy not only to bomb the
World Trade Center but also to attack prominent leaders and many
New York City landmarks.66 Those conspirators included Sheik
Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, a cleric who preached violent jihad
to followers who included many of the other convicted terrorists.67
Of the initial thirteen defendants in the second case, two pleaded
guilty (one to the entire indictment), and eleven others were
convicted at trial.68 The year-long case involved "just about every
59. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 11 (timeline of events).
60. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998).
61. Benjamin Weiser, Trade Center Bombing Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at BI.
62. United States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 847
(2002), cert. denied sub nom., Abouhalima v. United States, 536 U.S. 967 (2002).
63. In March of 2008 the Federal Bureau of Prisons website stated that all four were serving
prison terms in the Florence Administrative Maximum Security Penitentiary in Florence,
Colorado. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Locator,
http://www.bop.gov/inmate locator/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 23, 2008). The earliest release
date was set for 2087. News stories have criticized the government for allowing the terrorists to
support others by mail. See Jim Popkin & Rich Gardella, Terrorists' Mail Still Not Monitored:
Prison System Yet to Crack Down on Incarcerated Terrorists, Report Finds, Oct. 3, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15120480/.
64. Salameh, 261 F.3d at 275.
65. Id.
66. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing the facts of the
conspiracy in detail); Blum, supra note 48 (putting the original number of defendants at fifteen).
67. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 23-24 (testimony of Patrick Colgan).
68. Id. at 11 (noting that the group was convicted in October of 1995).
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law enforcement agency" and almost a full year's worth of
testimony.69 The defendants were convicted on almost every charge
against them.7" Rahman received a sentence of life in prison.7 Other
conspirators were sentenced to serve between 25 years and life in
prison.7 2  All of the sentences save one were upheld on appeal.73
After resentencing, the final sentence was also upheld.74
A third round of prosecutions was undertaken in 1997 when the
U.S. government later located two additional conspirators from the
1993 World Trade Center attack, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad
Ismail.75 Immediately after the attacks, the two had fled the United
States.76 Yousef originally traveled to Iraq but was later apprehended
in Pakistan. 77 Ismail was apprehended in Jordan.7' At separate trials
in 1997, both Yousef and Ismail were convicted of charges involving
the use of explosives to kill people and conspiracy.79 Yousef was
also convicted of counts related to a conspiracy to blow up airliners
in Southeast Asia."° At sentencing, Yousef received a prison
sentence of 240 years, as had the other conspirators."' A few months
later Ismail received a 240 year sentence as well.82 The defendants
69. Id. at 22, 24 (testimony of Patrick Colgan).
70. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 103.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center,
supra note 35, at 11 (noting that sentencing took place on January 17, 1996).
73. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 103.
74. United States v. Elgabrowny, 10 F. App'x. 23, 24-26 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding sentence
reduced from fifty-seven years to thirty-three years).
75. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 11 (noting that trials ran from August through November of 1997).
76. Benjamin Weiser, The Trade Center Verdict: The Overview; "'Mastermind" and Driver
Found Guilty in 1993 Plot to Blow Up Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at Al.
77. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 11.
78. Neil MacFarquhar, Angry Bomber or Shy Youth: Two Portraits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1995, at 33.
79. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 160 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933
(2003).
80. Id. at 164.
81. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 12 (testimony of J. Gilmore Childers) (noting that Yousef was also sentenced to a 240 year
prison term); Benjamin Weiser, Mastermind Gets Life for Bombing of Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1998, at Al (upon hearing the sentence Yousef declared that he was "a terrorist" and
"proud of it").
82. News reports also mention that he was assigned to pay $10 million in restitution.
Weiser, supra note 30, at B2.
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were also ordered to pay significant fines and awards of restitution.83
Ismail was ordered to pay a $250,000 fine and $10 million in
restitution. 4 Yousef, considered the "mastermind" of the plot, was
ordered to pay a $4.5 million fine and $250 million in restitution.85
An appellate court upheld the 240 year sentences, as well as the fines
and restitutionary payments.86 In Yousef's case, because of evidence
that he had easy access to large sums of money and refused to report
his assets, the payment of fines and restitution was made collectible
immediately, not subject to later earnings.87 One additional suspect,
Abdul Rahman Yasin remains at large despite United States efforts
to capture him.88 He is listed on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list.
89
Congruent with the criminal prosecutions related to the attack,
hundreds of individual plaintiffs injured in the bombing filed civil
suit.9" Those suits focus on the allegedly negligent security practices
of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("the Port
Authority"), the buildings' owner and operator.91 The multiple
individual suits were consolidated for trial on the issue of the Port
Authority's liability, though not on the issue of damages. In re
World Trade Center Bombing Litigation Steering Committee v. The
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,92 the consolidated
litigation, encompasses suits from three major constituencies-
people injured in the bombing, families of people killed in the blast,
and businesses located in the World Trade Center.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Yousef 327 F.3d at 164-65.
86. Id. at 164-66, 172-73.
87. Id. at 165.
88. Tina Kelley, Suspect in 1993 Bombing Says Trade Center Wasn't First Target, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2002, at A10.
89. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Most Wanted Terrorists: Abdul Rahman Yasin,
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/teryasin.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
90. Hartocollis, supra note 34, at B3 (noting that "hundreds of people and companies"
originally filed suit); Anemona Hartocollis, Judge Wants No Reference to Sept. 11 in Terror
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005, at BI (noting that the trial which went to the jury "consolidates
more than 400 cases"); A Terror-ble Ruling, supra note 11 (estimating the original pool of
plaintiffs at 655).
91. Mark Fass, Trial Commences Over 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, 234 N.Y. L.J. 1,
1 (2005); see In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713, 716 (Sup. Ct. 2004),
aff'd, In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig. Steering Comm. v. The Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
784 N.Y.S. 2d 869 (App. Div. 2004) (noting that the litigation joins more than 175 individual
cases).
92. 784 N.Y.S. 2d 869.
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In 2008, fifteen years after the bombing, litigation in the civil
case remains unresolved.93 However, most of the cases brought as a
part of the litigation have been settled.94 Of the forty-seven cases
that remain in active litigation, the vast majority, forty-three, are
personal injury claims.95
Over the years of protracted litigation, the civil suit has
encompassed a number of legal issues in the lower courts and on
appeal.96 In essence, the legal action alleges that the Port Authority
was negligent for failing to close the Trade Center's four-hundred-
car public parking garage in light of the foreseeable risk that
terrorists could drive a truck bomb into the building through that
route. 7
Evidence introduced by the plaintiffs in opposition to the Port
Authority's motion for summary judgment suggests that the Port
Authority was aware of terrorist threats but elected not to take
precautions against them due to financial concerns. Specifically,
testimony introduced by plaintiffs showed that as early as the 1980s,
the Port Authority was aware that the World Trade Center was a
highly symbolic target to terrorists, that car bombs were becoming a
prominent method of terrorist attack, and that attacks on the United
States took place in the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area.98
Accordingly, the Port Authority created an internal Terrorist
Planning and Intelligence Section.99 The section's 1984 report
suggested that the underground parking garage was an easily
accessible, potentially vulnerable point of attack.' 0 Peter Caram,
head of the section at that time, has both testified and written at
93. See Dunlap, supra note 32.
94. Hartocollis, supra note 34.
95. Id.
96. The Port Authority launched its defense by asserting that it should be entitled to
withhold discovery because documents contained sensitive security data. See Blum, supra note
48.
97. Id. (suggesting that the cases will "fall or rise on notice and foreseeability by the Port
Authority of an attack"); see In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713, 716 (Sup.
Ct. 2004).
98. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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length about the warnings he provided to World Trade Center
officials.'
Later in 1984, Peter Goldmark, executive director of the Port
Authority from 1977-1985, met with Scotland Yard officials who
were "appalled to hear we had transient [public] parking directly
underneath the towers."'' 2  In light of the concern expressed by
Scotland Yard concerning the vulnerability of the World Trade
Center's parking garage to terrorist attack, Goldmark convened a
special antiterrorist task force later that year.' 3 The task force,
named the Office of Special Planning ("OSP"), included a variety of
different personnel and consulted with the FBI, the CIA, the National
Security Agency, the U.S. Secret Service, Department of
Transportation, Department of Defense, Department of State, and
security officials from several other countries."° The OSP listened to
experts, visited other large commercial buildings, examined
blueprints and photographs of the World Trade Center, and analyzed
targets in terms of "criticality, accessibility, vulnerability,
recuperability and extended effect that destruction of the specific
target would have."' 5
After their months-long investigation, the OSP issued its final
report entitled Counter-Terrorism Perspectives: The World Trade
Center. The 1985 report recognized that the World Trade Center
was a "most attractive terrorist target," discussed car bomb incidents,
and flagged the public parking garage as a "definite security risk."' 6
The report stated that the parking garage provided "unimpeded
access for someone bent on putting a car bomb into the World Trade
Center parking lot," to affect "[v]irtually all of the important building
systems.""1 7 With exacting prescience, the report concluded:
A time bomb-laden vehicle could be driven into the WTC
and parked in the public parking area. The driver could
then exit via elevator into the WTC and proceed with his
101. See PETER CARAM, THE 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING: FORESIGHT AND
WARNING (2001).
102. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 719; Hartocollis, supra note 5,
at A6.
103. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
104. Id. at 719.
105. Id. (quoting Defendant's exhibit Q report).
106. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Defendant's exhibit Q report).
107. Id. at 721 (quoting Plaintiffs' exhibit 13).
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business unnoticed. At a predetermined time the bomb
could be exploded in the basement. The amount of
explosives used will determine the severity of damage to
the area. °8
Based on the risk that a truck bomb could be driven into the
public parking lot, the OSP counseled the World Trade Center to
eliminate all public parking in the Center. °9 The task force also
noted more modest security measures that might be adopted, such as
having manned entrances to the public parking area, restricting
pedestrian entry into the area, subjecting vehicles to random
inspection, and providing a police patrol with an explosives-
detection dog.110
The report was issued to several top officials at the World Trade
Center in 1985, four months after Goldmark left the Port
Authority."' His successors decided not to close the public lot,
citing the potential loss of revenue and inconvenience to tenants." 2
The Port Authority also decided not to adopt most of the compromise
security measures that had been recommended, again based on
financial and other considerations." 3 However, in 1986 and 1991,
the Port Authority did seek second and third opinions from additional
security firms." 4 Evidence cited in the court's opinion suggested that
subsequent security opinions flagged similar security issues,
including vulnerability of the parking garage to attack."5  The
second security opinion, unlike the first, deemed security measures
to address the problem "very costly." It did not perform a cost
analysis though, and the only cost it presented to the Port Authority's
director was $83,000 for "barriers to deter car bomb attempts," a
measure estimated to reduce risk of a terrorist attack by 40 percent."6
In 1993, just a month before the Trade Center bombing, the FBI
108. Id. (quoting Defendant's exhibit Q report).
109. Id.
110. Id.; Hartocollis, supra note 5, at A1.
111. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 720; Hartocollis, supra note 5,
at Al.
112. Hartocollis, supra note 5, at Al.
113. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
114. Id.
115. Id. (discussing the reports of outside consultants, Science Applications International
Corporation and Bums and Roe Securacom).
116. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs' exhibit 30).
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informed the Port Authority of a "threat from the Mideast to blow up
a major office building in New York."'' 7 Some heightened security
measures were implemented but only for a weekend." 8
After the bombing in February of 1993, the injured parties
sought to assign blame, not only to the terrorists, but also to the Port
Authority for its failure to follow the many security
recommendations it had received in the decade prior to the
explosion. The civil suit alleged a number of specific failures by the
Port Authority including failure to restrict public access to the
parking levels, failure to have an adequate security plan, and failure
to have a backup communications system, among other
complaints." 9 Some of the business claims were for breach of
lease.2°
The Port Authority moved for summary judgment on two
grounds. First, it asserted that it should enjoy governmental
immunity or, in the alternative, be found to have no duty to the
plaintiffs. Second, it argued that the bombing was not foreseeable as
a matter of law, particularly in the absence of prior similar
incidents. 2' The trial court rejected both arguments, concluding that
"based on the statutes and the case law, the Port Authority was not
immune from liability," and that in light of plaintiffs' evidence
"there are triable issues of [material] fact with respect to the
foreseeability of plaintiffs' damage and injuries." '22
The court's conclusion on the first issue was largely based on
state statutes that waive the Port Authority's sovereign immunity to
tort claims.'23 According to the plain language of the statutes, before
the statutes' enactment in the 1950s the Port Authority was entirely
immune from suit.'24 After the statutes were enacted, it was not.'25
The enacted statute expressly states:
117. Id. at 723 (quoting Plaintiffs' exhibit 15).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 726 (noting the claims of Dean Witter).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 727.
123. Id. at 728 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-158 to -162 (West 1990) and N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 7101-7112 (McKinney 2000)).
124. Id. at 729.
125. Id.
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Although the Port Authority is engaged in the performance
of governmental functions, the said two States consent to
liability on the part of the Port Authority in such suits,
actions or proceedings for tortious acts committed by it and
its agents to the same extent as though it were a private
corporation. 126
In its performance of proprietary functions-running a
commercial building-the court held that the Port Authority owed
the same duty to physically maintain the building and provide
security for tenants as would have been owed by similar commercial
landlords. 127 Only to the extent that plaintiffs claimed inadequate
police patrolling of the complex would a portion of the claim be
considered a particular governmental function and denied.1
28
On the second issue-foreseeability-the court recounted an
expansive record of repeated prior warnings about a potential
terrorist attack. 129 The trial court held that "[t]he predicted scenario,
eerily accurate, in the Port Authority's security reports, of a vehicle
bomb in the garage, and the evidence of bomb threats in the
complex, are sufficiently similar in nature to the bombing to raise a
triable issue as to foreseeability."'3 The court rejected defendants'
attempt to invoke the prior similar incidents test. "The fact that an
explosive-laden vehicle had not previously been placed in the WTC
garage does not, as the Port Authority appears to be arguing, make
this event unforeseeable as a matter of law."'
' 31
The case then went to a jury, which unanimously concluded,
after apparently wrenching testimony from former Port Authority
Director Peter Goldmark himself, that the Port Authority was
negligent for failing to take the proposed security measures. 132 By a
four to two vote, the jury also found that the Port Authority's
conduct did not rise to the level of recklessness.
133
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-162 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 7106 (McKinney
2000).
127. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 731-32.
128. Id. at 733.
129. See id. at 736, 738-39.
130. Id. at 736.
131. Id. at737-38.
132. Hartocollis, supra note 5.
133. Id.
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Had the jury's assignment of liability been the end of the matter,
as it would have been prior to changes in the law occurring shortly
before the verdict, the case might have looked like a large but
otherwise garden-variety case of negligent security. The tenant is
injured by an act of crime. The landlord did not take reasonable
steps to prevent the foreseeable criminal harm. Compensation is
awarded.
However, a recent change in the interpretation of New York law
required the jury to take a further step-not only to declare the
parties who were at fault, but also to apportion percentages of
responsibility for the harm in a zero-sum fashion among all
potentially responsible actors, including intentional tortfeasors.'34
Thus, if the terrorists were assigned 99 percent of the responsibility,
the Port Authority must be assigned the remaining 1 percent, and
vice versa.
In compliance with this new practice of apportioning
percentages of responsibility, the jury was required to apportion
responsibility between the Port Authority which failed to take
appropriate precautionary measures and the terrorists who hatched
and executed the bombing plot. The jury's assignment of
responsibility--68 percent to the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey and 32 percent to the terrorists-was anything but
garden variety.
In post-trial motions, the Port Authority appealed a number of
issues. In particular, it asked the district judge to overturn the
apportionment and conclude that the terrorists had "at least half of
the responsibility" or award a remittitur of not more than 20 percent
of the responsibility to the Port Authority. 1
35
Judge Nicholas Figueroa of the state's trial court specifically
affirmed the jury's verdict. The judge determined that "the jury in
the instant case, was able to find, based on the facts, that defendant's
culpability was greater than the bombers' fault.' ' 36 In particular, the
judge relied on evidence that the Port Authority knew in advance of
the World Trade Center's vulnerability as well as the danger posed
134. See Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 726 (N.Y. 2002).
135. Post Trial Brief for Defendant The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey at 24, In
re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., No. 600000/94 (N.Y. Dec. 5, 2005) (suggesting that 20
percent of the liability would be appropriate).
136. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., No. 600000/94, at 23.
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by terrorists, yet deliberately decided not to act.137 The judge also
relied on the tradition that apportionment, like other discretionary
questions resolved by a jury, is a matter entrusted to jury
discretion. 138
The Port Authority appealed both the jury verdict and the post-
trial rulings that upheld it to the New York Supreme Court's
Appellate Division in Manhattan.'39 This appeal, the sixth in the
case, took particular aim at the jury's apportionment of
responsibility.140 The appeal also raised issues about matters of care,
governmental immunity, and causation.14
The appellate court upheld the jury's verdict against all of the
defendant's arguments. With respect to the standard of care, the
court disagreed with the Port Authority's contention that it had either
no duty or only a minimal duty of care.'42 Rather, given the
proprietary function of the Port Authority acting as a commercial
landlord, the court held that the ordinary standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances applied. Nor was the court willing to say
that, as a matter of law, the defendant had met this standard. Under a
risk-benefit analysis, the court detailed the Port Authority's ample
prior notice of the risks. 4 3 As the court noted, the bombing "had not
merely been foreseeable, but had actually been foreseen.""''4 The
court also addressed the "potentially catastrophic magnitude" of the
truck-bomb and noted that "dire risks" must be managed differently
than more routine risks. In contrast with this true probability of a
dire risk, the court examined the "inconsequential" cost of
precaution.'45 The four hundred public parking spots would simply
have been transferred to tenants.'46 Furthermore, evidence of custom
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Hartocollis, supra note 34, at B3.
140. Id.; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., No. 600000/94 & 129074/93, at 13 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb.
26, 2007) [hereinafter Brief for Defendant-Appellant].
141. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 140.
142. Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586-88 (App. Div. 2008).
143. For a fuller discussion of the use of cost benefit analysis for evaluating cases of
catastrophic risk, see Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 140-48, 264 (2004).
144. Id. at 587.
145. Id. at 589, 592.
146. Id. at 593 n.8.
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did not aid the defendant. The Port Authority's lack of precaution
was contrasted with expert testimony that even in the mid-1980s and
early 1990s, the "industry practice" was "either to eliminate or to
place strict controls upon public parking under or immediately
adjacent to unusually large, high-profile buildings" such as the
Smithsonian Institution, Union Station, and the Bank of Boston.
147
Given the disconsonant level of care that defendant took relative to
other large building owners and the uneven risks and utilities of
defendant's conduct, the court held that the record would "not
compel the legal conclusion that defendant's duty had been met even
if the applicable standard of care required only minimal
precautions.' 48
In terms of causation, the court noted the "futility" of an attempt
to argue lack of causation in traditional terms. Apparently,
"defendant's own witness" testified that implementation of
"recommendations to heighten security at the public parking garage
would have deterred the bombers ... from committing the February
26, 1993 bombing."'4 9 Defendant's more novel request to assert that
recommended precautions "would not have deterred the bombers
from carrying out another 'similar attack,"' perhaps on a different
date or at a different location, was denied given the lack of authority
to support the legal proposition and the lack of evidence to support
the scenario in any event.'50
Finally, the court upheld the jury's apportionment of
responsibility. The court rejected the claim that a negligent
tortfeasor could not be assigned "a percentage of fault higher than
that of the parties whose intentional conduct concurrently caused the
bombing."'' Instead, the court framed the apportionment issue as a
factfinder determination to be examined in the particular context and
circumstances of the case.'52 In this case, the court upheld the jury's
apportionment allocation because the Port Authority's negligence
was not inadvertent but resulted from "deliberate decisions by
defendant's top management" and the intentional wrong "was not
147. Id. at 591.
148. Id. at 592.
149. Id. at 593 n.9.
150. Id. at 593.
151. Id. at 594.
152. Id. at 595.
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simply concurrent with the negligence, but to an unseemly degree
flowed from the negligence and was determined by it"--an analysis
that seems strikingly similar to a very duty analysis.'53 In upholding
the jury's allocation the court was careful to point out that the
apportionment was not an apportionment of "comparative
reprehensibility."'54 Nor did it in any way absolve the terrorists of
responsibility for their "murderous acts."' 55
II. FROM No LIABILITY TO LIABILITY (AND BACK AGAIN?):
THE EVER-CHANGING LAW OF CARE TO PROTECT
AGAINST CRIMINAL ACTS
It did not take long for the public to notice the World Trade
Center verdict or to sense that something was amiss. Public criticism
was swift and ample but ultimately narrow-focusing exclusively on
the question of whether the empanelled jurors had arrived at the
wrong numeric percentages. The Port Authority itself attacked the
judgment as "the product of a jury hijacked by Al Qaeda
sympathizers."' 56 From the outset, that argument seemed dead on
arrival:a New York jury allied with the reviled terrorists who
threatened the local population and were jailed for life? But in one
form or another, the theme persisted-the problem with this verdict,
and with other verdicts like it, was a problem with juries.'57
To date, public discourse has not yet alighted on the deeper
problem underlying the verdict-changes in New York's
comparative apportionment law. Throughout all of New York
history, the liability of a proprietor like the Port Authority had been
decided directly:either there was no liability (the norm for many
years) or there was liability. After 2002, jurors were asked for the
153. Id. at 596.
154. Id. at 597.
155. Id. at 598.
156. Anemona Hartocollis, Port Authority Seeks Voiding of Jury Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2005, at B2.
157. A Terror-ble Ruling, supra note 11 ("What happened here is that six misguided jurors-
feeling understandable sympathy, perhaps, for the victims-bought into the contorted logic of
fee-hungry lawyers who were targeting the agency's deep pockets."); see also Stevens v. N.Y.
City Transit Auth., 797 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 2005) (modifyring institution-heavy
judgment as "against the weight of the credible evidence").
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first time to assign liability for failure to protect against crime and
then, to pare back that liability in light of the crime.158
In essence, over the last hundred years New York law has
moved through three phases: (1) a time when proprietors had no
liability to protect against criminal harms; (2) a more robust doctrine
of liability for negligent failures of protection; and now (3) an
uncertain future. Currently, although the trend towards protection
against crime is still formally recognized, the doctrine is of uncertain
value because of its intersection with a new set of legal doctrines-
several liability and comparative apportionment. Overall then, the
history is of expanded third-party liability and indirect contemporary
limits.
A. Evolution of a Duty of Care
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, property owners,
landlords, and many others generally had no tort liability for failing
to take reasonable security measures to protect against crime.'59 This
was true in New York as elsewhere. 6 ' Doctrinally, the no-liability
policy was expressed by one of two mechanisms. In the first
limitation, courts held that a private party had "no duty" to protect
another against criminal attack by a third person. 6' Courts also
frequently denied liability under a second doctrine-proximate
cause. 162  Through this doctrine, even if a party failed to take
appropriate precautions against foreseeable crime, the criminal was
considered a superseding cause of the plaintiffs injury, which barred
a successful liability action against the negligent party. 63 To be sure,
158. Of course, crime is not identical with the tort category-intentional tort. For ease of
discussion, however, the terms are used interchangeably in this Article.
159. See generally Miriam J. Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime?,
2 CARDOZO L. REv. 299, 306-12 (1980) (discussing the origins and changes in the doctrine in the
context of landlord-tenant cases).
160. See Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 365 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (App. Div. 1975)
(changing the rule in the context of residential landlords, but citing several earlier cases that had
barred recovery).
161. Haines, supra note 159, at 306.
162. Saugerties Bank v. Del. & Hudson Co., 141 N.E. 904, 904 (N.Y. 1923); Smith v. ABC
Realty Co., 336 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (App. Div. 1972) (holding that landlord's failure to repair the
broken glass in tenant's window as requested was not the proximate cause of an intruder's
entering her apartment through the window and raping her).
163. Abbott v. N.Y. Pub. Library, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966 (App. Div. 1942) ("The act of a third
person such as [the patron who committed the assault], not an employee or otherwise connected
with defendant, committing an intentional tort or crime, which he concededly did, is ordinarily a
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this superseding cause limitation was not absolute.'64 Creative
exceptions to that rule have been cited as an early foundation for the
later development of enabling torts. 6
The early no-liability rule was justified on a number of bases.
Many of these rationales were formalistic. According to Prosser, the
rule "may have been due in part, to the idea, which once had some
currency, that the law fulfilled its function if it provided one legally
responsible defendant, and that it was superfluous, uneconomical and
confusing to the issue to offer more."'66 In terms of policy, it was
said that the landowner was not required to anticipate a crime by
some third party.'67 Moreover, the idea of a broader duty to care for
crime was criticized based on the uncertainty of that obligation, the
cost of security precautions, and the public nature of the policing
function. '68
Yet, despite the general rule of no liability, there were
exceptions. Exceptions were made, for example, when criminal
attack was foreseeable and a special relationship existed between the
defendant and either the attacker or crime victim.'69 An influential
article in 1934 argued that as a part of these special relationships, a
"duty is imposed upon the occupier of the land to use reasonable care
to protect his business visitors not only from his own dangerous
superseding cause of injury for which defendant would not be liable."); see also Schwartz v.
Cohen, 119 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Tirado v. Lubarsky, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (Civ.
Ct. 1966), aff'd, 276 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1966).
164. See Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921).
165. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 435,439 (1999).
166. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 21, § 42.
167. Tirado, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 56 (rejecting claim against landlord for failing to repair door
lock from which burglar may have entered and stating that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances no
one is chargeable with damages because he has not anticipated a crime by some third party").
168. Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 186 A.2d 291, 298 (N.J. 1962) (rejecting claim that municipal
housing authority had duty to provide police protection).
169. See id. at 301 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (noting that courts have "repeatedly held that where
there are special conditions from which the owner or operator of the premises should recognize
and foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to invitees from criminal or
wrongful acts of others, he must take reasonable precautions which may, under the circumstances,
fairly and justly entail the employment of special guards or police," and citing many New York
state cases in support of this contention); Ferraro v. Bd. of Educ., 212 N.Y.S.2d 615, 627-28
(App. Div. 1961) (emphasizing the special relationship between a school and students); see also
Haines, supra note 159, at 307.
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activity but from the conduct of third persons, whether other business
visitors or trespassers."'7
Relatively early on New York recognized a number of special
relationships that gave rise to defendants' responsibility to use care
to prevent crime. These relationships included care by defendants
held to a high standard such as innkeepers, common carriers, and
possessors of premises open to the public. 7' Some of New York's
early exceptions to the no-liability rule were particularly expansive
given the time. For example, in Abbott v. New York Public
Library,7 ' a 1942 case, a New York court held that a public library
had a "duty of ordinary care and reasonable supervision so that...
patrons would not be unreasonably exposed to dangers," which
included the danger of being attacked by another patron known to be
violent. '73
Over the second half of the twentieth century courts in New
York and elsewhere expanded obligations of care to prevent
foreseeable criminal harms. 7 4  The liberalization occurred in part
because courts began to see that doctrinal barriers were not essential
bars to recovery. For example, the superseding cause rule was
recognized as permitting exception when a library could foresee that
a patron who had earlier stabbed one patron would later take a
hatchet to another, absent a report by the library to police. 5
Similarly, the superseding cause rule could also be jettisoned when a
landlord charged tenants in order to install a buzzer system to
address rampant crime on the property but then failed to keep the
170. Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43
YALE L.J. 886, 903 (1934).
171. See Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210, 1214
(D.C.N.Y. 1976) (upholding liability of motel owner for negligence resulting in Connie Francis'
being criminally assaulted in a motel and upholding a verdict of $2.5 million against the argument
that the judgment was excessive); Amoruso v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 207 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856
(App. Div. 1960) (holding that a common carrier had a "duty to take reasonable precautions for
the protection and the safety of its passengers" that encompassed police protection against assault
at a subway station that had experienced prior similar incidents of crime); Abbott v. N.Y. Pub.
Library, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963, 968 (App. Div. 1942) (permitting recovery where a library had not
reported to police a stabbing committed by a patron in its facility and the patron returned on
another day and injured another patron with a hatchet).
172. 32 N.Y.S.2d 963.
173. Id. at 968.
174. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 324 (2000); Haines, supra note 159, at 300.
175. See Abbott, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 967-68.
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system in good repair.'76 Although one context involved a premises
owner and a public invitee and the other involved a landlord and
tenant, the principle was the same. "'If the likelihood that a third
person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the
hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."""
In many instances, rationales for a duty of care in one context
appeared to apply equally to others. For example, in the premises
liability context, New York courts had long held that a landowner
had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent trespassers from firing
guns from the landowner's property.'78  Although those early
shooters were apparently aiming at ducks when they shot the
plaintiff, and so were negligent intervening actors, some decades
later the court had no trouble expanding that doctrine to encompass
both a duty to use care to prevent a drunken assault (in a dram shop
action in which proximate cause was not required)'79 and a duty to
use care to prevent intentional misconduct.' When New York
courts recognized a landowner's duty to use reasonable care to
protect against crime, it viewed that obligation as a "natural
176. Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 365 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1975) ("The fact
that the immediate cause of the tenant's injury was the act of a third party, i.e., a criminal
intruder, does not prevent the landlord's negligence from being regarded in contemplation of law
as the Proximate cause.").
177. Id. at 244 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: TORTIOUS OR CRIMINAL ACTS
THE PROBABILITY OF WHICH MAKES ACTOR'S CONDUCT NEGLIGENT § 449 (1965)); see also
Abbott, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 966-67.
178. DeRyss v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 9 N.E.2d 788, 790 (N.Y. 1937) ("Thus if the railroad
authorities knew that persons were in the habit of shooting guns from its bridges or signal towers,
ordinary caution would have required the company to take measures to stop it; such practice
continued after knowledge of its existence and an opportunity to end it would make the company
liable.").
179. See Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Soc'y, 340 N.Y.S.2d 137, 142
(App. Div. 1973) ("One in control or possession of the premises has the duty to control the
conduct of those permitted or invited to enter upon the premises and such person in control is
required to exercise it for the protection of others.").
180. See Nallan v. Helmsley Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1980); see also Moody v.
Busy Comer Retail Meat Store, Inc., 387 N.Y.S.2d 154, 154 (App. Div. 1976) (ordering a jury
trial against a store in which the owner knew that the employee had "a gun, without a holster, in
his belt or pocket, yet did nothing about it"); Ward v. State, 366 N.Y.S.2d 800, 808 (Ct. CI. 1975)
(asserting that "a landowner has the affirmative duty of protecting those legally on his premises
from the negligent and criminal acts of third persons," but denying recovery on other grounds).
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corollary" to New York's longstanding duty to keep premises safe in
other ways. 8'
This expansion of common law principles from one context to
another was not exclusive to the development of New York law but
applied to many nationally significant cases in the area.'82 As the
D.C. Circuit wrote in one influential case that recognized a duty of
reasonable care by residential landlords, there have been many other
contexts in which a special relationship grounding a duty has been
established and "[i]n all, the theory of liability is essentially the
same."
, 183
But while expanded liability seemed to relate back to earlier
legal obligations with respect to safety and repair in a fairly natural
way, it is perhaps no coincidence that the expansion to encompass
protection against criminal harms took place, in New York and
across the country, when it did-in the 1970s. At the conclusion of
the 1960s, crime rates seemed to be exploding at a break-neck
pace.'84 In a 1971 opinion which urged the legislature to allow a
tenant-majority to require the landlord to install a buzzer
communication system, a New York court opined, "the crime
statistics remain increasingly frightening."'8 5  Citing several recent
crime statistics, the court wrote that "[flor the first six months of
1971 there was an increase in New York City of 30.1 percent in
homicides, over a like period in 1970." '86 Given that reality, the
court asserted that intercommunication systems "are as vitally
necessary in [multiple-unit] buildings as hot and cold water, heat,
light, power, elevator and telephone service.
' 187
Minimizing risks of crime was visibly on state agendas, as was
the idea that the police could not be "expected to do it all."'88 It was
181. See Nallan, 407 N.E.2d at 458 (citing cases from as early as 1915). Although, New
York Housing Codes required the landlord to maintain premises in "good repair," N.Y. MULTT.
DWELL. LAW §§ 78, 302-a (McKinney 1929), repairs originally were not thought to include those
needed for crime prevention. Tirado v. Lubarsky, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (Civ. Ct. 1966).
182. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
183. Id. at 483.
184. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 5-6 (2007).
185. People v. Gruenberg, 324 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (Crim. Ct. 1971).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 373; see also Brownstein v. Edison, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(holding that building security is an essential issue of habitability).
188. Kline, 439 F.2d at 484.
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not exactly that private parties were needed to augment failing public
security forces but that they needed at least to be responsive to the
risks of criminal harm that only they could address. As the New
York courts noted, citing District of Columbia rulings, "where the
landlord has notice of criminal occurrences 'in the portion of the
premises exclusively within his control' which are likely to recur,
'and has the exclusive power to take preventive action, it does not
seem unfair to place upon the landlord a duty to take those steps
which are within his power to minimize the predictable risk to his
tenants."'"89  The "inability of an individual tenant to control the
security of common hallways, elevators, stairwells, and lobbies," in a
commercial building was cited as a factor in expanding liability to
commercial landlords as well. 9 As a practical matter, this type of
third-party control of "factors that determine whether or to what
extent others will be exposed to a danger" is one of two situations in
which liability generally has been found. Another is "when the third
party, by virtue of position, has superior information regarding a
danger."'' Liability in these contexts is designed to encourage safety
precautions and reduce crime.'92
By the early 1980s, many jurisdictions allowed negligent
security actions in a broader range of cases.' 93 Today, the rule of
reasonable care to protect those on the premises is "usually
generalized" to require "reasonable care even to protect against
criminal acts."'94 Although jurisdictions vary, property owners are
ordinarily expected to take reasonable care to protect against
foreseeable crime, along with more mundane hazards.'95 Violence in
business parking lots is one typical backdrop for negligent security
suits. 96
189. Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 365 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245 (App. Div. 1975) (citing
Kline, 439 F.2d at 481).
190. Doe v. Dominion Bank of Wash., N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
191. Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1422 (1999).
192. Id. at 1423 (citing language to this effect from many recent state court cases).
193. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 21, § 63 (discussing a growing number of courts that had
imposed "duties of reasonable protection upon landlords").
194. DOBBS, supra note 174, § 324; PROSSER ET AL., supra note 21, § 42 (noting that the rule
of the last human wrongdoer "is now of purely historical interest").
195. DOBBS, supra note 174, § 324.
196. See, e.g., McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 904 (Tenn. 1996).
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Even under an expanded system of potential liability for failure
to protect against foreseeable crime, liability in any given case is far
from certain. There are many current cases in which courts have
denied recovery, for example, when a crime was not foreseeable or
when reasonable care was taken. 97 However, liability for negligent
security leading to criminal harm is still a broadly accepted theory of
liability.
And yet, potent potential restrictions on plaintiff recoveries for
this liability have emerged, not from direct but from indirect sources.
Negligent security cases always involve at least two potential
defendants-the party that negligently failed to take appropriate
security precautions and the criminal himself. Consequently, the law
governing multiple actors has particular significance to liability in
this context. It is that law-the law of comparative apportionment-
to which the article now turns.
B. Comparative Apportionment
Under traditional rules of joint and several liability for single
indivisible harms, the question of proprietor liability for negligence
leading to crime was resolved under a relatively simple process. The
plaintiff could sue the criminal for the intentional harm and the
proprietor for negligence that led to the attack. In the negligence
action, the plaintiff would be required to prove all of the traditional
elements of negligence against the proprietor but no more than that.
Once the negligence claim was proven, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover full compensatory damages. A plaintiff who pursued an
action against both the proprietor and the criminal was restricted to
one satisfaction of damages. In terms of contribution, if both the
criminal and the negligent tortfeasor had money, the criminal, as the
active tortfeasor, would be required to indemnify the proprietor, as
the passive one.
This approach still prevails in most states, either because the
state retains joint and several liability for multiple actors who cause
single indivisible injuries or because the state's several liability
system does not extend to intentional torts.'98 In fact, this approach
197. See, e.g., Tyson v. Danbury Mall Ltd. P'ship, 811 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App. Div. 2006);
Petra v. Saci, Inc., 796 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (App. Div. 2005).
198. Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative Apportionment and
Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 372-76, 384-86 (2003).
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was in force in New York at the time that the 1993 World Trade
Center Bombing Litigation was filed. 99 The law was not definitively
overruled in New York until the litigation had been pending for
almost a full decade. °0
Had this more traditional approach to apportionment involving
negligent and intentional torts still been in force in New York when
the 1993 World Trade Center Litigation was decided, the jury's
verdict would have been far different. Plaintiffs still would have had
to establish that the Port Authority failed to use reasonable care to
protect against a foreseeable terrorist attack and that the Port
Authority's negligence was an actual and proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries. Once established, however, the jury simply
would have been asked to assign compensatory damages. The Port
Authority's responsibility would have been assigned directly, rather
than in comparison with the responsibility of any other party
(although any terrorist assets would be fair game in an indemnity suit
brought by the Port Authority). Thus the question of the Port
Authority's responsibility relative to that of the terrorists would not
have been raised and no percentages would have been assigned.20 '
The Port Authority's liability might have made headlines, and even
raised controversy, but the tenor of the public debate would likely
have lacked the bewildered and furious tones.
What makes the actual verdict in the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing case so different than the judgment plaintiffs would have
obtained under the prior law, is the comparative responsibility
calculation that the jury was required to make-assigning
percentages of responsibility between the Port Authority and the
terrorists. This decidedly new approach has its origin in two current
legal trends-the trend of states to abolish joint and several liability
as a part of tort reform measures and the more recent trend of courts
to expand comparative apportionment systems to intentional torts.
The move to abolish joint and several liability in the 1980s was
a legal change that occurred as a part of tort-reform agendas
199. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKinney 2008).
200. See Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 725-26 (N.Y. 2002).
201. Of course, there is a ranking of responsibility in the traditional system to the extent the
Port Authority could seek full indemnity from the terrorists.
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advanced by particular interest groups in state legislatures.2"2 A 1986
New York Act stated t that when a personal injury case involved two
or more tortfeasors, if a tortfeasor was found to have "fifty percent or
less of the total liability assigned to all persons liable," the tortfeasor
would be liable only for that percentage of the non-economic loss.20 3
A second section of the Act set forth a list of situations in which that
liability limitation would not apply.2"4
Unlike legislative moves to reduce the scope of joint and several
liability, the move to incorporate intentional torts into comparative
apportionment systems has been a more complex process. At
present, only a minority of states include intentional torts in
percentage apportionment comparisons." 5 That minority did not
exist until the last decade, however, and may be growing. For the
most part, the trend to include intentional torts in comparative
apportionment (previously referred to as comparative fault) has been
propelled by courts rather than legislatures, although a few
legislatures writing statutes after the year 2000 have expressly
addressed the issue.
20 6
In terms of practice, when courts include intentional torts within
comparative apportionment, juries are required to apportion
responsibility among all potentially responsible actors, including
known (and in some jurisdictions unknown) criminals.2 7 Under this
approach, the jury is asked to apportion percentages of responsibility
among various parties, including criminals, negligent parties, and
crime victims. The jury is informed that the assigned percentages,
when added, must equal 100 percent.
Although inclusion of intentional torts in comparative
apportionment systems is not a direct negation of a proprietor's duty
to use care to prevent foreseeable harm, it is a powerful but indirect
way to diminish that responsibility.0 8 When intentional torts were
202. Joseph Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 654-55 (1990); Bublick, supra
note 198, at 365 n.29.
203. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKinney 2008).
204. Id. § 1602.
205. Bublick, supra note 198, at 367.
206. Id. at 378 n.87 (listing state statutes that expressly include intentional torts).
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 (2000).
208. See, e.g., Stevens v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 797 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 2005)
(holding that negligent train operator could not be responsible for more than 20 percent of the
plaintiffs damages).
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not included in apportionment, the negligent party could be called on
to pay full compensatory damages to an innocent victim. However,
once the jury is asked to apportion fault between the intentional and
negligent party, the negligent party may only be called on to pay a
fraction of those damages. If the jury assigns the lion's share of the
responsibility to the criminal, or the court requires that result, the
negligent party, even if independently judged to have significant
fault, need pay only a tiny percentage of the damages that its
negligence caused.2"9  Thus, in effect if not in name, the
apportionment system can function as the equivalent of a no-duty or
slight-duty rule (unless courts compensate for the liability reductions
in individual cases by substantially increasing the number of cases in
which they permit recovery against negligent parties).
In this case, the jury was instructed to make assignments of
responsibility that totaled 100 percent. The jury did so. The
percentages they entered-68 percent Port Authority and 32 percent
terrorists-would preserve a more robust duty of the Port Authority
to use care to prevent foreseeable criminal acts. In fact, in light of a
New York law that preserves joint and several liability for
defendants assigned more than 50 percent of the total
responsibility,21 the jury's verdict would allow the plaintiffs to
collect not just 68 percent of their compensatory damages from the
Port Authority but full compensatory damages-exactly the same
position plaintiffs would have been in had New York apportionment
law not been extended to include intentional torts. Furthermore,
although assigned 32 percent of the liability, the terrorists would still
be liable for full compensatory and punitive damages under a special
section of the New York statute that applies to intentional
tortfeasors.2 '
Appeals in the case will determine whether jurors in New York
can still assign liability awards up to the full amount of
compensatory damages, or whether the range of compensation jurors
can grant victims of negligence leading to criminal harm has shrunk
to less than 50 percent of compensatory damages-a substantial trek
209. See, e.g., id. at 544 (holding that apportionment of 60 percent of the liability to criminal
was too little in light of "the heinous crime" and setting a new trial on apportionment unless the
plaintiff would agree to collect only 20 percent of her damages from the third party).
210. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKinney 2008).
211. Id. § 1602(5), (7).
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back from the expanded duty of care to prevent criminal harm that
had, until recently, prevailed.
III. REJECTING COMPARATIVE CALCULATIONS IN THE CASE OF
INTENTIONAL TORTS: THE BETTER REASONED VIEW
Perhaps one of the most striking ironies of the shift to include
intentional torts in New York's comparative apportionment system is
that it is not clear whether anyone in New York-the courts, the
legislature, or the people-actually wanted this system.
A. New York's (Unintended) Shift to Include Intentional Torts in
Comparative Apportionment.
The history of New York's comparative apportionment law is
instructive. In 1986 the New York legislature enacted a law, known
as the "Toxic Torts Bill," that in part limited joint and several
liability."' However, the law explicitly stated that "[t]he limitations
set forth in this article shall ... not apply to actions requiring proof
of intent."2 3  When questions arose about whether the statute
therefore precluded a negligent tortfeasor from seeking to apportion
responsibility with an intentional tortfeasor, Appellate Division
judges within the same department were split and announced their
"'inability to reconcile their views. '214 Ultimately, in 2002, the New
York Court of Appeals broke the tie. The Court of Appeals held that
the legislative restriction on "'actions requiring proof of intent"' did
not preclude apportionment between negligent and intentional
tortfeasor defendants. 215  However, the court noted that there was
"little legislative history" to suggest the legislature's preference with
respect to this question.216 In fact, having crafted the law in the mid-
1980s, when no state had ever compared defendants' negligent and
212. Id. § 1601; Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 315, 319 (App. Div. 1997).
213. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1602.
214. Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 725 (N.Y. 2002) (comparing an earlier New York
Appellate Court decision in Chianese v. Meier, 729 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 2001), precluding
apportionment between negligent and intentional tortfeasor defendants, to two other appellate
court decisions permitting such apportionment). See Concepcion v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps.
Corp., 729 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App. Div. 2001); see also Roseboro v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 729
N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 2001).
215. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 724 (quoting N.Y. Civil Practice Law § 1602 (Consol. 2008).
216. Id. at 725-26.
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intentional torts by percentages, and virtually no one had raised that
possibility, the legislature most likely had not even thought of the
issue.217
Yet while the New York Court of Appeals is the institution that
allowed the inclusion of intentional torts within the state's
comparative apportionment system, it is not fair to suggest that the
doctrine was a court-embraced plan either. The court did not purport
to decide the issue based on its own ideal policy choice. Instead the
court viewed its role in the controversy as an effort to "implement
the will of the Legislature as we see it. '218  Perhaps reflecting its
skepticism about whether it could see that will one way or another,
the court noted that "the Legislature has the last word as to what it
intended. 219 From its view, the court wrote of the split opinions in
the lower court: "we recognize that there is cogency and anomaly in
both positions. 22 °
In terms of public preference, there is no evidence that there was
any testimony about the question of comparing intentional and
negligent fault at the time the legislation was passed. This absence
of evidence exists despite the Court of Appeals' observation that "the
record by this time has surely been scoured."
22
Analysis of New York's shift to include intentional torts within
its comparative apportionment system thus begins with the unusual
observation that the proposition seems to have become law without
the express policy support of the people, the legislature, or the courts.
217. Cases apportioning defendants' intentional and negligent fault generally arose in the late
1990s. For some early cases comparing defendants' intentional and negligent torts, see, for
example, Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 647 (Ct. App. 1994), Blazovic v.
Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 223 (N.J. 1991), and Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d 379, 380 (N.M. 1994).
There was some earlier discussion of whether a plaintiffs comparative fault should be a valid
defense to a defendant's intentional tort. One of the earliest articles on that subject was Jake Dear
& Steven E. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy
Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1984). Academic discussion of comparative
apportionment between defendants arose somewhat later. See William E. Westerbeke &
Reginald L. Robinson, Survey of Kansas Tort Law, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1049 (1989).
218. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 725.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 726.
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B. Incorporating Intentional Torts Into Comparative
Apportionment: Undesirable Effects and Unsatisfactory
Justifications.
Given the lack of stated policy reasons for the New York rule's
enactment, this section will instead address: (1) the potential effects
of including intentional torts in comparative apportionment; (2) the
desirability of those effects; and (3) the misguided justifications
commonly used to support the rule.22  To begin, although
apportionment of intentional and negligent torts is often discussed in
monolithic terms, apportionment issues involving intentional torts
can arise in at least three distinct contexts. Comparisons frequently
involve comparing the responsibility of a negligent defendant, like
the Port Authority, with that of an intentional tortfeasor defendant,
such as the terrorists. However, apportionment of intentional and
negligent torts can also encompass comparisons of responsibility
between an intentional tortfeasor defendant and a negligent
plaintiff-comparing the terrorists' responsibility with the alleged
victims' responsibility. Finally, comparisons can involve claims
brought by an intentional tortfeasor plaintiff like the terrorists against
a negligent defendant, such as the Port Authority. To date,
comparison of intentional and negligent torts, when permitted, is
most frequently accepted in the first context, occasionally accepted
in the second, and rarely accepted in the third.223
Across these different contexts there are six potential effects of a
decision to compare intentional and negligent fault by percentages.
The first potential effect is that intentional tortfeasors, like terrorists,
might be able to reduce payouts to victims based on the assigned
responsibility share of the negligent tortfeasor (in our example, the
Port Authority). As such, the terrorists might argue that they should
not be called on to pay the percentage of responsibility assigned to
the Port Authority.
Second, although not at issue in the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing case, in many cases victim fault can be raised as a part of
comparative apportionment assignments.224 In the 1993 World Trade
222. Bublick, supra note 198, at 386-420 (examining at greater length state court
misconceptions about apportionment as well as its real effects).
223. Id. at 367-69.
224. See Bublick, supra note 191, at 1415.
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Center Bombing case, suppose defendants claimed that a person who
had been trampled in the crush of people trying to get through the
stairwell in the dark, contributed to her own injury by not taking a
less-populated route out of the building. If a jury had assigned a
percentage of responsibility to that victim, the terrorists might be
able to reduce their payouts to the victim based on the percentage of
responsibility assigned to her.
A third potential effect of comparisons that include intentional
torts is that the terrorists might be able to reduce their share of
indemnity and contribution with respect to a negligent defendant,
like the Port Authority. Under apportionment, the intentional
tortfeasor does not indemnify the negligent party for 100 percent of
the judgment. Instead, even if intentional-tortfeasor terrorists had
ample resources, they might not be able to be called upon to pay the
Port Authority's share of the judgment.
A fourth potential effect of comparisons is that terrorists might
be permitted to file suit as plaintiffs against the negligent party. In
this case, terrorists could sue the Port Authority for its lack of care.
A fifth potential effect of comparisons is more intangible-
comparisons of intentional and negligent actions change
apportionment into a system that is "impossible in theory," because
the comparisons require jurors to commensurate incommensurable
misconduct.225  Without a meaningful standard with which to
compare these incommensurables, jury discretion is increased.
Moreover, appellate review becomes strained. The expressive value
of jury verdicts becomes opaque if not disorienting to the public-
what share of the responsibility belongs to the terrorists and what
share belongs to the victim?
Finally, the sixth potential effect of including intentional torts in
comparative apportionment is that a negligent actor like the Port
Authority might be able to reduce payouts to victims based on the
percentage of responsibility apportioned to the intentional
tortfeasors-here, the terrorists. With pure several liability, an entity
like the Port Authority could reduce its payment for compensatory
damages by the 32 percent assigned to the terrorists. With pure
several liability in a case in which the jury assigned 90 percent of the
225. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreward, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT
OF LIAB., at xii-xiii (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) 1999).
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responsibility to the criminals, the negligent actor might only have to
pay 10 percent of the compensatory damages for its negligence,
which was an actual cause of the victim's full harm.
At the outset, to identify the six potential effects of including
intentional torts within apportionment is not to say that all of these
effects will actually be realized in every case in every state. While
many states have yet to craft provisions eliminating many of these
effects, New York law already eliminates at least a few potential
effects of the comparison. For example, New York law specifically
retains joint and several liability for people who "act with reckless
disregard of the safety of others," in order to prevent parties like the
terrorists from reducing their liability to victims based on the Port
Authority's fault.226 Presumably the intentional tort exclusion would
apply here as well.227 In addition, New York currently appears to bar
intentional tortfeasors, such as the terrorists, from taking advantage
of victim fault assignments (though not from assigning those
percentages in the first place).228 Moreover, New York has a
modified version of several liability, so percentage assignments to
defendants might not have a direct impact on reduction in payment
of damages.229 The number of potential effects that are translated
into actual effects may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Although analyzed at greater length elsewhere, it is difficult to
imagine that state legislatures have a robust preference for the first
five of the six potential effects of including intentional torts in
apportionment systems.23°  While there may be marginal
circumstances in which a state would prefer apportionment to an all
or nothing judgment in the context of the first five potential effects,231
states that include intentional torts in comparative apportionment
226. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602(5), (7) (Mckinney 2008).
227. Id.
228. See City of New York v. Corwen, 565 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that
comparative negligence was inapplicable to complaint alleging bribery), overruled on other
grounds; City of New York v. Keene Corp., 756 N.Y.S.2d 536 (App. Div. 2003).
229. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKinney 2008).
230. See Bublick, supra note 198, at 386-92.
231. Id. at 367-69 (discussing low-culpability intentional tortfeasors such as children); see
also Alami v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 766 N.E.2d 574 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that motorist's
legal intoxication at time of accident did not operate on grounds of public policy to bar
administrator's crashworthiness claim).
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have moved to quash several of these effects either through judicial
decisions 2 2 or subsequent legislation.
233
Consequently, in terms of desired benefits of a shift to include
intentional torts in comparative apportionment, the discussion must
focus primarily on the last effect-restricting the liability incurred by
negligent actors like the Port Authority. There are two main issues
surrounding the third party liability reductions that apportionment
effectuates. First, are liability reductions substantively desirable, and
second, is apportionment the best mechanism by which to permit
those reductions?
It is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively address
whether liability reductions might be substantively desirable, but a
few preliminary thoughts are in order. Whether third parties should
be fully liable for failure to protect against crime is a complex
question. Asking this question in a broader frame, "[w]hen should
we impose liability on parties who, although not the primary authors
or beneficiaries of misconduct, might nonetheless be able to prevent
it," Professor Reiner Kraackman formulated an influential theory of
"gatekeeper" liability.234  According to the theory, successful
prevention of harm through gatekeepers is preferable when the
following factors are present: "(1) serious misconduct that practical
penalties cannot deter; (2) missing or inadequate private gatekeeping
incentives; (3) gatekeepers who can and will prevent misconduct
reliably; and (4) gatekeepers whom legal rules can induce to detect
misconduct at reasonable cost. '235  Certainly a case for gatekeeper
liability can be made in the context of precautions against crime. In
addition, it can be persuasively argued that only full liability of third
parties will provide optimal deterrence against crime.236
232. See, e.g., Williams v. Thude, 934 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ariz. 1997) (upholding differential
treatment that disfavored willful and wanton plaintiffs).
233. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323(c) (2008) ("[l]f a person suffers injury, death, or loss
as a result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an intentional
tortfeasor, his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced.").
234. Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy,
2 J.L. ECON & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).
235. Id. at 61.
236. Lewis A. Komhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple
Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831, 833 (1989) ("Except where one actor's damage does not affect the
extent of damage caused by another, only joint and several liability rules produce the efficient
result.").
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Indeed, after expansion of the legal obligation of private entities
to use care to prevent crime in the 1970s and 1980s, crime rates in
the 1990s showed "a very substantial and nationwide drop, across all
categories of serious crimes, steadily progressing throughout the
decade.237 Aggregate crime in the seven offenses tracked by the FBI
declined between 23 percent and 44 percent. 8  Crime reduction in
New York City, in particular, led many of these declines. 39 While
no causation arrows can be drawn, if changes in public policing get
credit for a significant portion of the crime declines, 2 4° there is no
reason that help from private policing measures might not ultimately
deserve joint billing.241 If so, reductions in incentives for private
policing may be unwise.
As a local policy preference, the New York legislature has never
said that it wanted crime victims to recover less than full
compensatory damages from third parties whose negligence led to
the harm. Clearly, the jury in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
case wanted the Port Authority to pay substantial damages to the
victims of its lapses-likely one of the central messages of its
verdict.242 If reducing payouts to crime victims is not somewhere on
the New York legislative agenda, including intentional ,torts in an
apportionment system would seem a particularly poor policy choice.
But even if a state seeks a partial-pay solution in accord with
contemporary norms of splitting,243 comparative apportionment
between intentional and negligent tortfeasors is a poor mechanism by
which to arrive at compensatory-damage reductions. Instead, states
237. ZIMRING, supra note 184, at 3.
238. Id. at 7.
239. Id. at 13-14, 135-68.
240. Id. at 151 ("The only inference that can be drawn [is] that there is strong circumstantial
evidence that compound major changes in the quality of police and the tactics of policing had a
major impact on crime.").
241. Cf Frank A. Sloan et al., Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 473, 497 (2000) (concluding that bar owners' and managers' increased perception of the
probability of a tort suit "increased the bar's level of precaution in serving obviously intoxicated
adults" and its level of monitoring "to avoid serving alcoholic beverages to minors," and noting
that "implementation of dramshop liability lowers motor vehicle fatality rates as well as fatality
rates for other alcohol-related causes").
242. In re World Trade Center Bombing Litigation, No. 600000/94 (N.Y. Mar. 2, 2007) at 30
(noting that plaintiffs' attorneys could argue for a greater than 51 percent judgment without
telling the jury the legal ramifications of that judgment).
243. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
859, 868-72 (1996) (noting a change in tort compensation from "all-or-nothing to splitting").
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would be far better served to allow reductions in negligent defendant
liability directly and with a greater focus on the negligent party's
own misconduct, rather than through apportionment and a negative
inverse correlation with another party's misdeeds, which may or may
not be warranted.'"
A system that would allow juries to make direct assignments of
compensatory damages at less than full compensation would permit
partial payouts to victims without the need for juries to engage in
troublesome responsibility comparisons. To facilitate consistency, a
guidelines system akin to the criminal sentencing guidelines could be
enacted.245 Other direct partial-pay options might be imagined. For
example, if the concern about Port Authority liability is a concern for
the public fisc, state law might hold the Port Authority liable for half
of its liabilities rather than for all or nothing. Statutes that do not
require the Port Authority to pay back-interest on the judgment may
effectively achieve such a split in a case like the present one in which
litigation has already dragged on for fifteen years.246
Without salutary effects of including intentional torts in several
liability apportionment, it is difficult to see why a number of state
courts have selected this option. Moreover, common rationales for
doing so turn out to be red herrings. Common but deceptive
rationales include: that each party should only be held liable for the
harm it "caused," that each party should only be liable for its "fair
share" of the fault, or that coherence problems would arise if
intentional torts were excluded from comparative apportionment, but
not if they were included.247
The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing Litigation is a useful
vehicle for dismantling all three of these rationales. First, in the
1993 World Trade Center Bombing case, both of the defendants'
misconduct was an actual cause of the victims' full indivisible harm.
But for the terrorists driving an explosives-laden truck into the
garage, the victims in this litigation would not have been harmed.
Similarly, but for the Port Authority's decision to keep public
244. Bublick, supra note 198, at 398-402.
245. Id. at 436.
246. NPR Day to Day, 2008 WLNR 3774061 (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 26, 2008) (noting
plaintiffs lawyer's calculation that "under New York State law, interest runs at nine percent a
year, and nine percent times 15 is more than 100 percent," all of which interest is uncollectible).
247. Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 726 (N.Y. 2002).
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parking open in spite of expert advice to the contrary, the victims in
this litigation would not have been injured. Indeed, had the jury
found that either the terrorists or the Port Authority were not an
actual cause of the plaintiffs' full harm, that party would not have
been liable at all. Accordingly, the apportionment stage of the case
would never have been reached. In this case, as in most negligent
security cases, the negligent defendants' and the criminal defendants'
conduct were both necessary but not sufficient causes of the victims'
full indivisible harm.248
Equally unwarranted is the argument that under comparative
fault, each party is liable only for its "fair share" of the fault.
Fairness is not capable of being ascertained as an essential
percentage allocation of relative fault; it is instead a normative
question. What has been seen as a fair share for a negligent
defendant to pay for carelessness leading to a crime has varied over
time. With the no-duty rule of the early and mid-1900s, what was
thought to be a fair share for the defendant to pay was nothing.249 In
the 1970s and 1980s, with the expanded view of premises owners'
duty of reasonable care along with joint and several liability, full
compensatory damages were thought to be a fair share for the
defendants to pay.25° More recently, New York courts have thought
that some sort of partial recovery based on apportionment would be
fair.251' These partial recoveries might be calculated in any number of
ways. Other types of solutions may later be developed. But there is
no one true "fair share" for the defendant's payment.
One need look no further than an argument that the assignment
of 32 percent responsibility to the terrorist means that the terrorist's
"fair share" of the judgment would be to pay only 32 percent of
victim damages. Even if the terrorists had been found to have one
percent of the relative responsibility, a fair share for the terrorists to
pay could be 100 percent of compensatory damages and then some
(for punitive damages as well).
248. Richard W. Wright, Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability,
and the Burden of Proof 41 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1295 (2008) (discussing causation under the
necessary element of a sufficient set ("NESS") test).
249. Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 336 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
250. Nallan v. Helmsley Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 460 (N.Y. 1980).
251. Roseboro v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (App. Div. 2001).
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A jury can calculate what it thinks would be fair damages for the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff in light of the defendant's
negligence. However, this fair amount for one defendant to pay may
or may not have a direct relationship with other defendants' relative
fault.
Criminal sentencing provides a useful example. In the criminal
context, the court did not tell jurors in the bombing cases against the
nineteen terrorist defendants that the jurors needed to decide each
defendant's percentage of responsibility for the overall harm from
the bombing with respect to the others. Neither did it assign shares
of relative defendant fault or responsibility and multiply those
percentages by a total number of years of prison time appropriate to a
bombing of this magnitude-100, 500, 1000, 10,000. The jurors and
judges were not told that if they gave one defendant a 240-year
prison term they would only have 760 years of prison terms left to
apportion among the other eighteen defendants. Instead, each
criminal sentence was assigned independently based on what seemed
fair in that case-not in any necessary relationship to the other
defendants' sentences.252 In fact, prison sentences of defendants who
had very different roles in the bombing were identical. That a
defendant called the "mastermind" of the operation had greater
participation and culpability than another defendant considered "the
driver" had precisely no effect on the prison term of either.253 This
was true even though relative defendant comparisons in the criminal
context would seem more appropriate than comparisons in the tort
context given the similar nature of the defendants' wrongdoing and
the similar purposes of imposing criminal sanctions on them.
Taking the example of the criminal law, courts should allow
jurors to assign responsibility based on the individual's own fault,
not that party's fault relative to a codefendant. This direct
assignment of responsibility has been a mainstay of tort law, no less
252. Tort scenarios might seem distinguishable on the theory that compensatory damages are
a single fixed sum, but there is considerable flexibility in compensatory damage awards. See
Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage Caps, 80
N.Y.U. L. REv. 391 (2005) (noting malleability of various components of damages, which often
are considered categorically distinct, such that imposition of caps on noneconomic damages had
no effect on overall compensatory damages). Compensatory damage awards for an inherently
unquantifiable loss like a death or injury may well vary based on the defendant called upon to pay
them.
253. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 164 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933
(2003).
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than that of criminal law. "[A] defendant's individual full
responsibility for an injury that was an actual and proximate result of
her tortious behavior does not become 'partial' or 'minimal' simply
because other defendants' tortious behavior was much worse,
individually or in the aggregate. '254 This same idea was aptly stated
by New York's intermediate court. "Neither the magnitude of a
defendant's negligence, nor its moral blameworthiness, nor the
closeness of its causal relationship to the harm necessarily
diminishes to subordinate significance in attribution of fault by
reason of the circumstance that the harm was concurrently
attributable to intentional conduct, even when the intentional conduct
is particularly heinous. To the contrary, as this case so vividly
illustrates, the blameworthiness of negligence may actually be
increased by the heinousness of the wrongdoing it directly and
foreseeably facilitates. 255
Finally, coherence problems remain whether intentional torts are
included or excluded from a comparative apportionment system
because several liability is based on the false premise that
responsibility is a neatly divisible zero-sum amount.256 By way of
example, imagine a case in which a landowner negligently fails to
repair the building's front door. The door, which is badly warped,
cannot be easily shut and often remains open. Tenants have notified
the landlord that they want the door repaired in light of two concerns.
First, the open door has allowed access to trespassers, including
some particularly menacing trespassers. Second, the open door has
allowed snow to accumulate in the entryway, making the floor
slippery.
Now imagine three situations in which injury occurs. In the first
scenario, as anticipated by the tenants, snow accumulates inside the
open doorway, and the plaintiff trips on it and breaks her ankle. In
the second scenario, a delivery person placing a package outside
carelessly knocks a heap of snow inside the doorway and decides not
to clean it up given his rush. The plaintiff trips and suffers a broken
ankle. In the third scenario, a criminal who entered through the open
254. Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 MEMPHIS
ST. U. L. REv. 45, 59 (1992).
255. Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 595 (App. Div. 2008.
256. Bublick, supra note 198, at 398-402 (describing at length coherence problems in a
several liability system).
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door is waiting inside the doorway and chases the plaintiff who trips,
resulting again in an ankle break.
In each of the three cases above, the landowner has committed
the same negligent act-failing to repair the doorway-and that act
has resulted in same harm to the plaintiff-tripping and breaking an
ankle. However, in the first case, there is no other defendant
involved in the case and therefore no apportionment issue so the
defendant will be responsible for full compensatory damages. In the
second case, the landlord's responsibility will be apportioned against
that of the delivery person-another negligent actor. If the jury finds
that the responsibility of the two is roughly equal, the landlord will
pay 50 percent of the compensatory damage judgment (or more if
joint and several liability kicks in at 50 percent). However, in the
third case, the landlord's responsibility will be apportioned with that
of a more nefarious actor-the criminal. If the jury finds that the
responsibility of the intentional actor is greater than the
responsibility of the landowner, perhaps far greater, the landlord
need only pay a small share of the same judgment-say 20 percent.
Accordingly, even though the landlord has committed the same
negligent act and caused the same harm to the plaintiff, the landlord
has a lesser percentage of liability for exposing the plaintiff to risks
of criminal rather than negligent or non-negligent harm--a different
form of incoherence.
Accepting that coherence problems persist in any apportionment
system that has a zero-sum apportionment mechanism with or
without intentional torts, and rejecting misleading arguments that
apportionment requires defendants to pay for only their fair share of
the causation or fault, does not mean that courts must either include
or exclude intentional torts in apportionment. It simply means that
when deciding whether and to what extent intentional torts should be
factored into the comparative equation, courts cannot hide behind
formalistic reasoning. Instead, they must look at the desirability of
the previously addressed effects of the apportionment of intentional
torts. When those effects are examined, courts should decline to add
intentional torts to apportionment calculations.
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C. Limiting the Impact of Apportionment with IntentionalTorts:
Adopting a Very Duty Rule or Reapportioning Uncollectible Shares
Even when courts have expanded comparative apportionment
systems to include intentional torts, apportionment in some types of
cases, such as the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing Litigation, can
and should be avoided. On this point, all major national legal
authorities agree.
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Apportionment of Liability has provided the most in-depth
consideration of the issue of intentional-negligent tortfeasor
responsibility comparisons in the negligent security context. Despite
controversy about the complexity of its work, the Restatement took
great pains to divide its apportionment rules into five different tracks
of liability to mirror the many different state systems enacted by
legislatures throughout the country. While different rules pertain to
each of these different tracks, a few rules applyacross all five tracks.
Specifically, across all of these tracks, the Restatement recommended
retention of joint and several liability for the category of cases in
which a person "is liable to another based on a failure to protect the
other from the specific risk of an intentional tort." '257 Professor
Dobbs, in his leading treatise, The Law of Torts, echoes his
agreement with this view when he counsels that perhaps "intentional
torts should be weighed on the comparative negligence scale in some
case patterns but not others." '258 In particular, he notes that weighing
is inappropriate in cases in which the defendant negligently risks
another's intentional harm.259 Also in accord is another major
national authority-the Uniform Apportionment of Tort
Responsibility Act authored by the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The Uniform Apportionment of Tort
Responsibility Act includes a provision that states: "If a party is
adjudged liable for failing to prevent another party from intentionally
causing personal injury to, or harm to the property of, the claimant,
the court shall enter judgment jointly and severally against the parties
for their combined shares of responsibility.
2 60
257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 14 (2000).
258. DOBBS, supra note 174, §§ 206.
259. Id. at § 206.
260. UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 6(2) (2002).
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The rule articulated by these many contemporary authorities
stems from teachings that have been accepted for many generations.
Although written in 1984, before apportionment of intentional and
negligent torts was at issue, the Prosser and Keeton treatise took a
similar position with respect to the very duty rule, which was then
important to the doctrine of proximate cause. "Obviously the
defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk,
or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant
has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass."2 6' Since at least
the 1940s, New York also recognized this rule.262 As the court wrote
in a premises liability case of that time:
[t]he happening of the very event the likelihood of which
makes the actor's conduct negligent and so subjects the
actor to liability, cannot relieve him from liability. The
duty to refrain from the act committed or to do the act
omitted is imposed to protect the other from this very
danger. To deny recovery because the other's exposure to
the very risk, from which it was the purpose of the duty to
protect him, resulted in harm to him, would be to deprive
the other of all protection and to make the duty a nullity.263
The logic of this rule is as true today as it was many years
ago:apportioning responsibility between one who enables and one
who perpetrates a risk of intentional harm risks nullifying or
diminishing the original duty. This is particularly true if courts
require intentional tortfeasors to be assigned more than 50 percent of
the total responsibility, correspondingly reducing the negligent
party's responsibility by more than half.
In this case, New York's intermediate court recognized the
significance of the fact that the intentional tort, "to an unseemly
degree flowed from the negligence and was determined by it.
26
Although not using the very duty terminology or negating the
intentional-negligent fault comparison directly, the court's focus on
defendant negligence that occasions the intentional tort looks like a
variant of the traditional "very duty" reasoning.
261. PROSSER ETAL., supra note 21, § 44.
262. Abbott v. N.Y. Pub. Library, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966 (App. Div. 1942).
263. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 449 cmt. a (1934)).
264. Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 596 (App. Div. 2008).
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IV. UPHOLDING INSTITUTION-HEAVY JUDGMENTS:
THE BEST OF A BAD WORLD
If a state like New York adopts comparative apportionment and
includes intentional torts in the comparison without exception, courts
have no choice but to address the issue of how comparisons of
intentional and negligent torts can be made.265 The former director of
the American Law Institute acknowledged that comparisons
"between an actor charged with negligence and an actor charged with
intentional misconduct" are "impossible in theory," but nevertheless
asserted that they were "feasible in practice." '266 However, the
difficulty. of a doctrine that is "impossible in theory" is not that it
cannot be put into practice, but that it cannot be put into a
theoretically sound and consistent practice. Enter the realm of the
second best.
A few sources of authority have already examined judicial
review of intentional/negligent responsibility comparisons. The most
noted of these are the Restatement (Third) of Apportionment,267 the
Uniform Apportionment of Responsibility Act, and the many state
courts that have reviewed inverse judgments.
As discussed in Part III, the Restatement views comparisons of
criminal misconduct with negligent failure to protect against that
conduct as unwise. Accordingly, the Restatement does not address
appropriate apportionment standards in this context. In other
contexts, the Restatement suggests examining two key factors in
order to assign shares of responsibility. The first factor involves "the
nature of the person's risk-creating conduct, including any awareness
or indifference with respect to the risks created by the conduct and
any intent with respect to the harm created by the conduct." '268 The
second factor is "the strength of the causal connection between the
person's risk creating conduct and the harm." '269
With respect to the first factor, both defendants in the 1993
World Trade Center Bombing Litigation were aware of and to some
265. Of course, there has always been an implicit apportionment of responsibility even
without formal apportionment systems.
266. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY at xii-xiii (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) 1999).
267. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (2000).
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (2000).
269. Id.
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extent indifferent to the risks. The terrorists knew that injuries were
likely and actively sought that result.2 ° For example, the terrorists
added metal powders and other chemicals to enhance the bomb's
destructive impact."' In addition, they set the bomb to explode in the
middle of a busy workday. 72 Evidence suggests that they hoped not
only for the risks and injuries they caused but also for the building
itself to come down.
Testimony also suggests that the Port Authority was aware of
the risks, not only of a truck bomb detonating in the parking garage,
but also of the broader devastation that a truck bomb would cause to
critical infrastructure systems. Perhaps Port Authority indifference is
also reflected in its willingness to accept major risk of physical harm
in return for fairly inconsequential benefits. Although the appellate
records reveal little data about the risks and benefits that factored
into the Port Authority's decision, preserving 400 public parking
spaces for a building with 20,000 employees and approximately
80,000 visitors or commuters each day seems like a relatively modest
good, particularly when other revenue-generating uses of the space
were feasible.274
Although both parties were aware of, and to some extent
indifferent to risks, their actions were not equally reprehensible.
With respect to the first Restatement factor, intended harm is
generally more culpable than negligence. While the greater
culpability of intended harm is often thought of as a truism, the
reality is more complex. At times, intended harm may be less
culpable than negligent harm.275  For example, intended harm to
270. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center, supra note 35,
at 17-18.
271. Id. at 12 (testimony of Henry J. DePippo).
272. Id. (noting that the bomb went off at 12:18 p.m.).
273. Id. at 2 (opening statement of Hon. Jon Kyl) (noting that "the death toll in New York
could have been much higher" and that "Ramzi Yousef, the central figure behind the bombing,
said he meant to collapse one of the World Trade Center's towers on top of the other, hoping to
kill 250,000 people inside and in the immediate area, but the explosion did not go according to
plan").
274. Id. at 17 (testimony of Henry J. DePippo); In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776
N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 2004), aff'd In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig. Steering Comm. v.
The Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 784 N.Y.S. 2d 869 (App. Div. 2004); Brief for Defendant-
Appellant The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing
Litig., Nos. 600000/94 & 129074/93, (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 26, 2007).
275. Bublick, supra note 198, at 417-18; Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of
Intentional Torts, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1088-90 (2006); Simons, supra note 28.
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property might be less culpable than negligent harm to human life.
Similarly, when the intended harm is small, perhaps stepping on a
toe, but the negligence involves a careless risk of dire
consequences,say nuclear annihilation, negligence may be more
culpable than an intentional tort. In addition, an intentional tort by a
low-culpability actor, like a young child, may be less culpable than a
tort committed by a negligent actor in full possession of decision-
making capacity. Or high culpability acts by the negligent actor,
perhaps rising to the level of recklessness, might make for a different
comparison.276
But all of these situations in which intended harm actually may
be less culpable than negligent harm are irrelevant to this case. Both
the terrorists and the Port Authority risked harm to persons as well as
property. Both risked massive damage. Both were decision-makers
who were fully morally accountable for their own choices. And the
jury expressly found that the Port Authority was not reckless. In
light of these factors, the intended bombing would be more culpable
than the negligent failure to guard against it. 7 Accordingly, the trial
court's suggestion that the Port Authority's "culpability" was greater
than the terrorists' fault seems to be the wrong justification for
upholding the allocation.278
Looking at the second Restatement factor---causation--it is
difficult to envision a framework for analysis because apportionment
has not previously been based on causation. However, scholars have
suggested some factors that could be used to compare causal
contributions. In this case, both the terrorists and the Port Authority
were actual causes of the plaintiffs' full harm under the "necessary
elements of a sufficient set" test.279 Moreover, to the extent that these
factors might still be taken into account in tort law, the terrorists'
causal connection to the bombing was both more direct and more
active. 211 However, a different factor--"indispensability" of
276. Bublick, supra note 198, at 368-69.
277. There is one caveat here. As discussed more fully with respect to causation, it might be
said that the Port Authority risked more harm by opening up critical systems to potentially
catastrophic harm. Although the terrorists desired massive damage, their placement of the bomb
did not risk as much harm as might have been realized.
278. See In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., No. 600000/94, (N.Y. Mar. 2, 2007).
279. Wright, supra note 248, at 1304.
280. As the NEW YORK POST put it, "Terrorists planned the attack, built the bomb, rented the
truck, drove it to the building-and exploded it." A Terror-ble Ruling, supra note 11.
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causes-might argue in favor of a greater responsibility share for the
Port Authority. 8'
The Port Authority argued that its failure to close the garage was
not an actual cause of the injuries because even if public parking had
been closed, the terrorists would have found another way to cause
harm (see, e.g., 9/11). This type of causal argument typically is not
accepted in tort law on the point of causation. 82 If it were permitted
to weigh into the apportionment calculus, it might still not persuade.
Whatever can be said of Osama Bin Laden's operation in 2001,
evidence about the 1993 bombers suggested that the terrorists were
not up to the challenge of surmounting many, or perhaps any,
obstacles at that time.
But such an argument for the centrality of the particular
terrorists to the harm might be offset by the argument which equally
could be raised on behalf of plaintiffs-that if this terrorist group had
not bombed the World Trade Center, with public parking open to all
comers, another terrorist group might have planted a bomb just as
well, perhaps with more devastating impact. According to the World
Trade Center's architect, if the terrorists' van had been left in a
slightly different location, the World Trade Center would in fact
have toppled during the first attack.283 This, in the architect's words,
could have been "a catastrophe that killed 40,000 or more. '284  If,
when comparing causation, a court looks at "more and less important
causes" and considers the "indispensability" of causes, the particular
terrorists might be considered the more dispensable cause because
there were more plentiful substitutes for them and their conduct. 85
In addition, if comparative causation involves, as some have
suggested, looking at the relationship between causes such that a first
cause which led to a second was assigned more weight, this factor
also would favor greater liability for the Port Authority.286 In at least
281. Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 913, 939 (1992).
282. Wright, supra note 248, at _.
283. Peg Tyre, An Icon Destroyed, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2001 ("On February 26, 1993, the
World Trade Center merely shook but did not collapse. But it was a close call. Later, the WTC's
architect would tell jurors that if the van had been left closer to the poured concrete foundations,
they would have succeeded. The tower would have fallen.").
284. The World Trade Center Bombing: A Tragic Wake-Up Call, supra note 36.
285. Strassfeld, supra note 281, at 939.
286. Id. at 926; see also Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d 379, 382 (N.M. 1994) (instructing the jury
that the degree of care required to protect increases as the risk of danger increases, so that the
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one state supreme court opinion, the focus on the greater causative
role of the party who afforded the opportunity for crime was a key
reason for upholding the verdict. 87
The Uniform Tort Apportionment of Responsibility Act
recommends apportionment factors consistent with those enumerated
by the Restatement. According to that model act, "[i]n determining
percentages of responsibility, the trier of fact shall consider: (1) the
nature of the conduct of each party... determined to be responsible;
and (2) the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the
damages claimed." '288 Although the Act is intended to replace the
earlier Uniform Comparative Fault Act, the phrase "nature of the
conduct" is not specifically defined. To the extent that the phrase is
defined in accordance with the previous act, the actors' "superior or
inferior capacities" might also be weighed in the equation, as is
currently done in some jurisdictions that apportion intentional and
negligent harms.289
If the care delivered is weighed against the care to be expected,
that factor might also militate in favor of a greater percentage of
responsibility apportioned to the Port Authority. 9 ° In a case that
apportioned responsibility for student sexual assault between a
school board and an elementary school principal who perpetrated the
assaults, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the jury "should be
instructed on the heightened duty of school boards to ensure
students' safety. 291' A similar account of expectations of the parties
was taken in a case in which police failed to respond to an
emergency call.292
Because there is no set formula for calculating the significance
of any of these different factors, putting them together yields no
obvious set of percentages, unlike that which might result from a
straight comparison of culpability. When electing to include
proportionate fault of the negligent tortfeasor is not necessarily reduced by the wrongful conduct
of the intentional tortfeasor).
287. Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Ind. 2003).
288. UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT §4(b) (2002).
289. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §2(b) (Commisioner's comment on allocating
percentages of fault); see also Vidrine v. Denton, 951 So. 2d 274, 284 (La. 2006) (applying
Uniform Comparative Fault Act factors including parties' capabilities).
290. See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 453 (Ariz. 1998).
291. Frugis v. Bracigliano, 827 A.2d 1040, 1059 (N.J. 2003).
292. Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 455.
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intentional torts in comparative apportionment systems, courts
professed confidence in juries' ability to make intentional/negligent
responsibility comparisons. Perhaps deference to juries will carry
the day now that jurors are being asked to make these amorphous and
difficult comparisons on a routine basis.
State appellate court judgments that review institution-heavy
apportionments of responsibility suggest that this high degree of jury
deference is indeed applicable to apportionment choices.293 A
number of state supreme courts and appellate courts have now had
the opportunity to review cases that apportion greater shares of
responsibility to negligent rather than intentional parties.294 These
decisions generally do not apply a rule of thumb that the intentional
tortfeasor must be assigned a larger share of the overall
responsibility. To the contrary, courts have upheld the institution-
heavy apportionments in many if not most of the cases. 95
However, approval of institution-heavy apportionments by
appellate courts is not universal. Several cases reverse these
apportionments when the criminal was assigned a trivial percentage
of the harm (under 5 percent),296 or when the court viewed the
apportionment solely as a normative statement about the relative
culpability of the parties.297
293. Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Ind. 2003).
294. See, e.g., Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 451; Paragon, 799 N.E.2d at 1055.
295. See, e.g., Manuel G. v. Golden State Family Servs., No. F047681, 2006 WL 965792
(Cal. 2006) (upholding jury verdict that assigned 90 percent of responsibility to county and foster
family agency who knew of foster child's violent tendencies, and 10 percent responsibility to
thirteen year-old foster child who assaulted other boy in foster care); Roman Catholic Diocese of
Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Ky. 1998) (upholding apportionment of responsibility
of 75 percent to church that retained teacher despite concerns about pedophilia and 25 percent to
teacher who sexually abused students); Weiss v. Hodge, 567 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Mich. 1997)
(upholding 80 percent responsibility apportionment to dram shop and 20 percent to drunk patron
who committed assault).
296. Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 797-98 (Ct. App. 1998)
(reversing 100 percent apportionment against school that continually reinstated teacher accused of
molesting children); Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 647 (Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that jury's apportionment of 99 percent of fault to county for negligent supervision of
child physically abused by foster parent was against the weight of the evidence).
297. Stevens v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 797 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 2005) (holding
that apportionment of 60 percent of the liability to criminal was too little in light of "the heinous
crime" as "[a]ny negligence by the train operator [who was alleged to have been speeding while
entering the station] cannot approach the culpability of the perpetrator"); Roseboro v. N.Y. City
Transit Auth., 782 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (App. Div. 2004) (holding blameworthy conduct of sleeping
clerk who failed to summon help "cannot approach the degree of culpability of the decedent's
attackers").
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Judicial rationales for upholding or reversing institution-heavy
apportionments have been spare. Perhaps the most significant debate
between and within courts about these verdicts is the relative
importance of structural versus individual factors. Arizona's
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix29 8 case and the Indiana appellate
court's decision in Paragon Family Restaurant v. Bartolini299 (later
reversed on appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court) provide useful
counterpoints. In Hutcherson, a jury assigned 75 percent of the
responsibility for two murders to a 9-1-1 operator who negligently
misclassified a domestic violence call as low priority. The
misclassification resulted in a substantial police delay during which
the two victims were killed."' Only 25 percent responsibility was
assigned to the ex-boyfriend who deliberately murdered his former
girlfriend and her new boyfriend.3"' Disputing defendant's claim that
the jury verdict was "illogical" and "so unreasonable and outrageous
as to shock the conscience,""3 2 the Arizona Supreme Court endorsed
the lower court's distinction between "culpability" and
"responsibility for foresight and avoidance."3 3 Using the lens not of
wrongfulness but of ability to effectively engage in crime prevention,
the court accepted the jury's apportionment.
In contrast, an Indiana appellate court placed greater weight on
individual factors. In Paragon, an Indiana jury assigned 80 percent
of the responsibility for a drunken assault to the tavern that served
alcohol to underage drinkers." Only 20 percent of the responsibility
was assigned to the drunken customers who started the fight."0 The
appellate court looked at the matter as a question about the
appropriate weight to be given to "spontaneous, unforeseeable and,
independent criminal acts" on the one hand, and the pubs'
"frequent[]" service of alcohol to minors on the other.0 6  The
appellate court thought that the spontaneous criminal acts merited
298. 961 P.2d 449.
299. 769 N.E. 2d 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 799 N.E.2d 1048.
300. Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 451.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 453, 455.
303. Id. at 453.
304. Paragon Family Rest., 769 N.E.2d at 621-22.
305. Id. at621.
306. Id.
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more responsibility and the repeat service of alcohol to minors less.3 °7
The Indiana Supreme Court, over a dissent, disagreed."8
At issue in these cases is the importance of assigning
responsibility to structural versus more individualized factors related
to safety. Structural factors are those factors that shape the
environment within which individuals make choices.3 9 Other areas
of safety regulation focus regulatory efforts on these factors because
they are thought to provide a greater measure of safety. An example
would be the "Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy" passed under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The policy requires
engineering controls before resort to individual safety measures.310
Under such a policy, in the context of reducing environmental
contaminants, an employer must reduce airborne environmental
contaminants as far as feasible through use of fewer toxic materials
or better ventilation before resorting to individual compliance
safeguards such as asking employees to wear respirators.31' Shaping
the external environment to provide safe conditions makes safety
"automatic" rather than dependant on constant individual attention.
Tort law, though different from direct safety regulations, shares
this interest in structural safety protections. For example, in the
negligent security context it has been persuasively argued that in the
case of a substantial risk in which individuals have "limited means of
providing safety" for themselves, a defendant who can provide
protection should have an expanded obligation to do so.312 This is
not an exception to principles of personal accountability, but a
reflection of them.313
Preservation of structural safety precautions is an issue in court
affirmances in many of the institution-heavy verdicts. In the
Hutcherson case, for instance, police response to domestic violence
307. Id. at 621-22.
308. Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1057 (Ind. 2003).
309. See Ellen M. Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REv. 977, 1013-16
(2003).
310. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1267 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
311. Id.
312. Dan B. Dobbs, Accountability and Comparative Fault, 47 LA. L. REv. 939, 970 (1987).
313. Id.; see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Culture, 152 U. PA. L.
REv. 129, 333-35 (2003) (providing a fascinating hypothetical about the personal responsibility
of not only the participants in the Milgram experiment but also the researcher and his University).
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victims is a systemic issue that affects the outcomes of multiple
cases. Similarly, a tavern's policy of serving alcohol to underage
minors impacts safety to a greater extent than does a particular
minor's decision to drink. The "lack of oversight or any effective
managerial controls" was the structural concern that led a New York
court to uphold a 66.6 percent apportionment of liability to the State
of New York when the state mistakenly released an inmate from
prison who, while out, raped two women and murdered one.
3 14 Of
course, in these cases both of the defendants have responsibility for
their wrongful conduct. But from a policy perspective, the law has
particular reason to preserve responsibility in cases of systemic harm.
Recognizing the concern that important liability rules placed on
structural actors might get obliterated in comparative calculations,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has established special jury
instructions. These instructions inform jurors of the important policy
function served by negligence liability in situations such as dram
shop acts and supervision of school children.315
From a policy perspective, the institution-heavy apportionments
are quite easy to justify in terms of deterrence, particularly in New
York where they yield a similar outcome as would adoption of the
very duty rule recommended by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
The verdicts would do no more than afford discretion to the jury to
assign a range of damages from no award to full compensatory
damages. This ability to continue entering a range of potential
damage awards against negligent tortfeasors would respond to the
concern that without a very duty rule, proprietor liability will be
obliterated because "the great culpability of an intentional tortfeasor
may lead a factfinder to assign the bulk of the responsibility for the
harm to the intentional tortfeasor.316
In terms of the tort policy of compensation, premises liability
allows losses to be spread over a wider group of people (through
private or social insurance stemming from the negligence action),
rather than falling solely and heavily on individual crime victims.
314. Steel v. State of N.Y., 800 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Ct. Cl. 2005).
315. Frugis v. Bracigliano, 827 A.2d 1040, 1058-60 (N.J. 2003); Steele v. Kerrigan, 689 A.2d
685 (N.J. 1997); Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REv. 1141, 1144 (1988).
316. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14 cmt (b).
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What impact settlements and potential judgments might have on the
public fisc is a subject of active public controversy. The Port
Authority does not collect taxes, but does collect fees, which it could
increase in light of settlements and judgments." 7 Fee increases
depend both on the magnitude of required Port Authority payouts
and the availability of insurance coverage for Port Authority losses,
as well as factors regarding the elasticity of demand for Port
Authority services. News reports suggest that in 1993 the buildings
were insured by property and liability insurance policies totaling $1
billion dollars.318 Whether that coverage would be enough to cover
the Port Authority's liability or whether the Port Authority might be
required to dip into the $4.5 billion a year it collects in revenue is
uncertain. 39 However, with only tens of cases remaining on appeal,
it would seem that these losses could be spread across some form of
private or public insurance without significant event.
There are also fairness reasons to allow institution-heavy
apportionments. The victims are not calling on just anyone to pay
the judgment (the type of victim compensation funds that prevailed
after the second World Trade Center bombing did not extend to these
victims). Instead, the victims' claims to repair stem from a wrong
done to them. The Port Authority, made a choice to impose what the
jury found to be undue risk of foreseeable harm upon the victims. To
the extent that wrongfulness depends on whether the group put at
risk is also the group benefited by the risk,32 this case provides
something of a mixed picture. The Port Authority's risk taking
imperiled everyone in the building. Some, like those who parked in
the open parking garage or had customers who did, may have
benefited from the risk taking. Certainly others did not.32' In
addition, imposing risk of harm for financial gain may compound the
317. Pradnaya Joshi, Long Road to Payoutsfrom PA, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 28, 2005.
318. Marks, supra note 50, at Al ("The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has
about $1 billion in property and liability insurance on the World Trade Center, the Comptroller
said.").
319. Joshi, supra note 317.
320. See Simons, supra note 28, at 1210.
321. Coleman, supra note 29; Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1957 (2007).
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wrongdoing.322 The jury's expression of indignation toward the Port
Authority through its verdict is consistent with a finding that the jury
felt the Port Authority had wronged the plaintiffs.323 In light of the
wrong done by it to the plaintiffs, the defendant has a duty to
repair.1
4
While the plaintiffs have a right to repair from the Port
Authority, institution-heavy apportionments might seem unfair given
the nature of the wrongs perpetrated by the parties. However, the
strongest way in which institution-heavy apportionments can be
squared with traditional notions of accountability is to view different
forms of responsibility, including tort actions, as a whole.325
Criminal punishment and civil liability are both parts of one picture
of repair for wrongdoing. In the civil action, with assignment of Port
Authority responsibility at 68 percent, both the terrorists and the Port
Authority could be fully answerable to the victims for compensatory
damages. In the criminal courts, the terrorists also have had many
additional penalties levied against them, most significantly, full-life
prison terms.
Even when a tort jury has assigned a dramatically higher share
of civil liability to the negligent party, the heavier weight of criminal
penalties ensures that corresponding condemnation has been
assigned to the intentional tortfeasor. One normative statement is
made by observing which defendant is locked in jail and which
defendant is being called upon to pay damages. As such, tort
apportionments need not be viewed as a normative statement about
relative culpability of the parties. As New York's intermediate court
wrote in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing case:
Were the dispositive consideration in passing upon the
jury's allocation of responsibility simply one of
comparative reprehensibility, we would not hesitate to
vacate the allocation as against the weight of the evidence;
there is no question that the bombers' conduct was utterly
322. Plaintiffs' attorneys sought to show that the Port Authority could have taken precautions
but kept the garage open for financial reasons. One attorney told the jury: "Money. That was the
motivating factor behind the Port Authority's decision." Fass, supra note 91, at 1.
323. Coleman, supra note 29, at 1154 (suggesting that indignation or resentment is the
appropriate response to a person who has committed a wrong).
324. Id. at 1155.
325. Id. at 1158.
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wanton and that defendant's negligence, albeit great and
facilitative of enormous harm, was not deserving of equal
odium.326
If tort law were required to make a normative statement about
the parties' relative culpability, many problems would arise. What
percentage of the total responsibility could the negligent party be
assigned under a system that compares reprehensibility? Would the
negligent actor's responsibility have to be limited to 50 percent or
less? But even 50 percent of the total responsibility would seem
problematic. Is it plausible to say that the terrorists have about the
same amount of responsibility as the Port Authority does? And yet,
holding liability down to a minor share of the total in order to create
an appropriate expressive statement would not likely preserve the
tort policies of criminal-harm prevention that operate in so many of
the negligence doctrines.
There are reasons, and ultimately persuasive ones, to uphold
inverse apportionments. However, there are also drawbacks to their
affirmance. First, if the legislature did mean to significantly reduce
negligent-tortfeasor liability to crime victims, upholding inverse
judgments may thwart the legislature's will. This concern seems
weak with respect to New York law given the dearth of evidence that
the legislature formulated any intent with respect to apportionment of
intentional and negligent torts at the time the legislation was enacted.
As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, however, the legislature can
have the last word on its intent if it so desires.
Another drawback to liability is that it may lead to over-
precaution, which is a form of waste. The purely financial costs of
precaution are staggering. For example, "Los Angeles International
Airport has to spend an extra $100,000 per day for additional
security when the alert level goes from yellow to orange." '327 If the
risk of liability encourages private entities to take costly but
ineffective security measures, financial resources will be misspent.
Moreover, the case for precaution in the face of terrorism may be
different than the case for precaution that responds to other more
typical and prevalent forms of crime.
326. Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 597 (App. Div. 2008).
327. DANIEL BYMAN, THE FIVE FRONT WAR: THE BETTER WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL JIHAD
134 (2008).
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Yet, precautions may deter crime, which can be costly in itself.
And, even when additional precautions do not deter harm they may
not be wasteful to extent that they purchase something else of social
value such as comfort or reduced fear. This is true for precautions
against terrorism as well as crime. In part, the costs of terrorism
stem from public reactions to the threat. "After 9/11, Americans
flew less and took fewer vacations, which led to massive job losses
in the aviation and tourism industries. 328  If increased precaution
encourages the public to engage in valuable economic activity like
flying on planes, those precautions, even if ineffective in reducing
harm, may promote economic welfare and lessen terrorists' power to
stifle the economy through the creation of fear and disruption.
Another concern with allowing a full range of juror judgments-
from no liability to full damages and every percentage in between-
is that the wide range of permissible verdicts may undermine the
consistency and predictability of the system, and therefore its
legitimacy.329  Moreover, even if institution-heavy apportionments
reach the same practical result as a very duty rule, their expressive
statement about responsibility may be so publicly unacceptable as to
further erode public support for the tort system.
Here, a partial solution might be to think about how institution-
weighted verdicts can be explained to the public. Perhaps the best
option is to redirect the apportionment discussion to the real question
in the litigation-not comparative fault but allocation of civil
responsibility. In the criminal realm, the terrorists are living out their
days in prison, and the former Port Authority decision-makers have
never been charged with even the smallest of crimes. The fault of
the parties is not equivalent, nor is the overall legal penalty similar.
Thus, even if 99 percent of the civil responsibility were apportioned
to the Port Authority, the overall responsibility for the event,
including criminal and civil fines, could still be disproportionately
assigned to the criminals.33 °
328. Id. at 152.
329. John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1455 (2008). (arguing that inconsistencies in Foreign Claims Act payments
made by the Army would undermine legitimacy of the program).
330. As a theoretical matter, apportionments of 100 percent responsibility to the negligent
actor could be upheld because the jury may only be implying that civil responsibility is not
needed for the intentional actor given the availability of other penalties. If that precludes civil
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Hyperbole about apportionment letting the criminals off the
hook is simply false.33' In New York, for example, criminals, as
intentional tortfeasors, are already jointly liable for the full amount
of their damages, even if assigned a responsibility share of a single
percent.332
But, why would responsibility in the civil context not track
responsibility in the criminal context? The answer lies in the purpose
of the civil law, which does not focus on punishment as the criminal
law does, but focuses greater attention on deterrence--crime
prevention. Here, we might say that in the realm of violent crimes,
civil responsibility is more likely to prevent violence when focused
on the nonviolent actors.
Take for example the difference between two recent news
stories-the escape and attack of a tiger at the San Francisco Zoo,
and terrorist killings of the beloved former prime minister of
Pakistan. In the first case, we would not think to assign
responsibility to the tiger-the direct cause of the harm-because the
tiger is not a moral agent. We would, however, assign responsibility
to the terrorist in the second scenario. But at a certain point, the fact
that the terrorist has full agency becomes almost irrelevant to the
issue of ensuring present safety. To be sure, if caught, the attacking
tiger and the terrorist will likely be confined or worse. But,
assigning civil responsibility to either seems entirely beside the
point. In both cases, the issue of safety is focused on what the
zookeeper and the authorities can do to provide a reasonably safe
environment given the existing threats.333
CONCLUSION
There is much at stake in judicial review of institution-heavy
apportionment verdicts. At issue is whether, in cases of crime, tort
liability will continue to meaningfully influence a broader range of
actors and actions than those addressed by the criminal law, or
liability for the intentional tortfeasor, courts should examine whether criminal penalties are truly
adequate to punish before accepting the apportionment.
331. A Terror-ble Ruling, supra note 11 (arguing that blaming the Port Authority absolves the
terrorist of responsibility).
332. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(5), (7) (McKinney 2008).
333. Dareh Gregorian, Fight Over WTC Suit, N.Y. POST, Jan. 10, 2008, at 24 (noting that the
Plaintiffs' attorney argued to the appellate court, "[w]e expect terrorists to act like terrorists and
the Port Authority should have expected it").
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whether tort law will be reined in to provide redundant focus on that
set of actors and actions that are already subject to criminal
sanctions.
The apportionment question posed to New York juries under a
part of the state's model jury instructions tells the jury-"you will
decide what is a fair division of responsibility for each
defendant" 334-- a broad question and also the right one. If the
question is fairness, to which party is it fair to allocate greater civil
responsibility? Perhaps the jury is allowed to, and is actually right to,
apportion greater responsibility to the party who will potentially be
influenced by that liability.
When the public looks at the jury's verdict in the 1993 World
Trade Center Bombing case, the verdict appears upside down. But
look again. Post 9/11, that seemingly inverted verdict may be the
only way juries can retain security. Post tort reform, it is actually the
world of tort law that is upside down.
What is aright, what may give hope even, is that despite legal
changes that could easily render the apportionment system unfair,
juries like the one in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
Litigation are still actively focused on justice.
334. N.Y. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 2:275 (West 2007).
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